Re: Numbers

From: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2006 12:14:39 -0800

1Z wrote:
...
>
> If the universe were deterministic, then consicousness would have to
> be epiphenomenal.

I generally agree with you position that there is no reason to suppose that all
mathematical structures are instantiated and that being instantiated is just
what distinguishes physical and mathematical. Howerever I don't think it is
necessary that consciousness be epiphenomenal in a deterministic universe.
I would say that consciousness is *identical* with the material processes of the
brain and nerevous system - whether the universe is deterministic or not.

However, the evidence is that the universe is not
> deterministic.

I don't think the randomness of QM helps consciousness divorce from material
processes.

>> >>> "Epistemic objectivity of maths" means "every competent mathematician
>> >>> gets the same answer to a given problem". It doesn't say anything about
>> >>> the existence of anything (except possibly mathematicians).
>> >> Well, if "every competent mathematician gets the same answer
>> >> to a given problem", "competent mathematicians" do not have
>> >> much freedom about what they might find as an answer to some
>> >> given problems. So there must "exist" "something" that
>> >> "constrain" them.
>> >
>> > Yes: rules, the principle of non-contradiction.
>>
>>So. These exist for you too? Are they physical objects?
>
>
> I don't need to hold that they have any existence separate
> form mathmaticians or textbooks.

You would appreciate "The Evolution of Reason" by William Cooper.

Brent Meeker


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Received on Fri Mar 31 2006 - 15:15:43 PST

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