Re: Numbers

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2006 18:32:42 +0100

Le 24-mars-06, à 20:49, 1Z a écrit :

>
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 20:38, 1Z a écrit :
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>> A quick point still :
>>>> You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it
>>>> due to
>>>> HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical
>>>> monism, but
>>>> a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose
>>>> mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not
>>>> mathematical
>>>> monism, still it support HP world.
>>>
>>> Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than
>>> mathematical
>>> MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a
>>> physical MW
>>> theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy.
>>
>> Quantum theory predict that there is a very tiny chance that a broken
>> cup of
>> coffee restructured itself... yet in everett mw theory as all choices
>> are
>> made, there exists branches where this happen all the time. Yet as
>> I'll quote
>> you "it is not observed"... but that does not mean anything against
>> everett
>> mw.
>
> The fact that a theory is makes predictions that are not observed is
> always against it.


I agree with this. It is an easy exercice to show that comp rules out
classical physics or more generally any single universe physical
theory. It predicts that if we look at ourself including our most
probable environment close enough (= at a lower level than our
substitution level) then we must be confronted with a notion of first
person (plural) indeterminacy. many weirdness of QM are easily
explained, although not yet all, to be sure.


>
>>> Plus physical
>>> theories
>>> have more resources available to explain why wrlds are separate and
>>> non-interacting.
>>
>> What resources ?
>
> space, time, causality.


This is what we are trying to explain without putting the mind-body
problem under the rug. Comp illustrates (to say the least) the
non-obviousness of such notion. It is hard to take them fro granted.
Especially where simpler explanations arise from computer science and
self-reference.



>
>>> Finally, there is no particular reason why I have to support physical
>>> MW theories either!
>>
>> That's the whole point where you wanted to get till the beginning,
>> you simply
>> refuse any many world theories.
>
> I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the
> basis
> of not matching my experience.


As Quentin said, the theory (comp and /or Everett) explained exactly
why it is hard to have the experience of many world. A fist person
cannot be first person aware of any of its third person duplication.
Only intellectually can she imagine it.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Mar 25 2006 - 12:33:45 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:11 PST