Georges Quenot wrote:
> peterdjones wrote:
> >
> > [...] What we can be sure of is that
> > 1) we exist
> > 2) we are conscious
> > 3) there is some sort of external world
> > 4) there is some phenomenon of time.
>
> *You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do
> not decide for others.
Is it possible for me to have a discussion with you ?
If the answer is "yes", you are conceding:
1) you and I exist
2) you and I are conscious
3) you are external to me and vice-versa
That only leaves (4), but I suppose all discussions take some time.
> > These are all quite problematical for Mathematical Monism;
>
> As *you* believe and understand them, certainly. *I* do not
> see any problem for mathematical monism (I do not need the
> upper cases) to make sense.
So you say. As things stand, I have to take your word,.
since you have not offered any explanation.
> > [...] Arguments should start with what you can be sure of.
>
> What "we" can be sure of (as well as what it might mean) can
> be very different from my viewpoint and from yours.
Viewpoints can differ without being equally valid. If you cannot
account for the existence of sucha thing as a discussion *in* a
discussion, you are in trouble.
> In order to have a chance to make the point, arguments that
> *you* address to *me* should start wtih what *I* can be sure
> of and not with what *you* can be sure of. And vice versa
> indeed.
>
> What I can be sure of is probably "weaker" than what you can
> be sure of. It is likely to be quite different too. That must
> be why it can be compatible with more (or different) ideas.
>
> Georges.
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Received on Fri Mar 24 2006 - 13:36:12 PST