Re: Numbers

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 12:02:45 +0100

Le 18-mars-06, à 16:00, peterdjones.domain.name.hidden a écrit :

> If every mathematical structure exists , then mathematical structures
> consisting
> of a counterpart of me plus a "Harry Potter" universe exist. Yet this
> is not
> observed. Of course that might be coincidence.


No it can't. This what the computationalist (or weaker) must explain.
This is mainly what the list is all about.

Hal Finney, like my oldest attempts, try to explain the lack of Harry
Potter or white flying bunnies, by the abonormal huge rate of
computations needed to sustain such "illusions" in a coherent way.
My critics in a nutshell is that such an explanation cannot work once
we make explicit the first and third person description. The first
person, being unable to know the UD's delays of computations, cannot
distinguish a high variety of little and less little programs, so that
Hal Finney sort of explanation is incomplete (at best). My way of
tackling the problem consists in translating the UDA in the language of
a universal machine. Thanks to incompleteness this makes sense, and we
eventually are lead to an arithmetical interpretation of the Platonist
theories of everything, which observable consequences, like quantum
logic, many-worlds interfering in a wavy fashion, etc.

Peter, what are your postulates? I think you are postulating an
aristotelian stuffy universe. Are you postulating comp? If yes, you are
in difficulties (cf UDA), if not, what is your theory of mind?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Mon Mar 20 2006 - 06:03:52 PST

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