Hi Norman,
Le 15-mars-06, à 17:32, Norman Samish a écrit :
> ( Norman Samish) I don't see how a list of numbers could, by itself,
> contain any meaningful information. Sure, a list of numbers could be
> an executable program, but there has to be an executive program to
> execute the executable program. The multiverse has to therefore
> consist of more than a matrix of numbers which amount to an executable
> program.
Norman, I realize that not so much people seem to get this point (which
is one of the main point I try to convey), and which is that if "I" am
a machine (in the sense of being able to survive with a digital brain)
then the "physical universe" cannot be emulate by any turing machine.
The basic reason is that the Physical Universe needs to emerge at once
from the set of all infinite computations, as seen from the first
person point of view, in a way which is a priori not turing emulable.
>
> (Bruno Marchal) I am not sure what you mean by matrix of numbers.
>
> (Norman) I made the implicit assumption that everything in the
> multiverse can be precisely described by a tape feeding a universal
> Turing machine. The tape feeding the UTM is the "matrix of numbers."
You are probably confusing the propositions A and B:
A) "I am a machine"
B) the universe is a machine (supposing there is a universe)
B implies A. (should be obvious) BUT:
A implies ~B (by UDA!, not so obvious)
From this it follows that in all case we have ~B (not B). That is: in
any circumstance the big thing cannot be emulate by a turing machine.
Of course many people makes that confusion (until they understand the
universal dovetailer argument). I think we need to come back to it.
>
>
> However, Bruno says the following, which, if I understand him, means
> he does not agree with my implicit assumption. I'm not clear on what
> Bruno means by "If comp is true. . ." My notion is that "comp" is the
> "computation hypothesis," which is that we first-person observers
> cannot tell if we are a computer simulation.
But we can. My work indeed show that comp entails we "already and
forever" are in a simulation, where the universal base can be "just"
arithmetical truth. I predict already a (tiny) part of the quantum
phenomena, and in that setting this can already be seen as a discovery
of the" dreamy nature" of our "universal home", let us say.
> If everything in the multiverse can be precisely described by a tape
> feeding a UTM, then it seems to me that "comp" must be true.
Yes, but the reverse if false. If "I" am turing emulable, then the
universe cannot be simulated by a turing machine. Remember that with
comp the measure problem consists in eliminating the white rabbits. The
1-person indetermincay is apparently bigger than the quantum
indeterminacy. Did you read the Universal Dovetailer Argument?
(apology for looking like a teacher, but it is hard for me to explain
without some idea of your knowldege of things already discuss in the
list. I can reexplain, just ask).
Best
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu Mar 16 2006 - 12:39:59 PST