daddycaylor.domain.name.hidden a écrit :
>
>Georges wrote:
>
>> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
Context: this is a conjecture/speculation.
> This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
> object.
> Otherwise it is nonsense.
In
http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe_frames.html, Max Tegmark
asks "Which mathematical structure is isomorphic to our Universe?"
and not "Which mathematical structure is our Universe?". So I guess
he sees a difference between both questions and that implies that
the second one is not a nonsense for him. He would probably explain
better than me how this could be.
I think that we need another conjecture/speculation to require the
identity. This would be the exclusion of the dualism I referred to
("there needs to be something special in the particles for the
universe to actually/physically exist"). Indeed, one might argue
that we rather need a conjecture/speculation for the *inclusion*
of that dualism. But the possibility seems to exist just like for
other forms of dualism and a speculation is always needed either
for their inclusion or their exclusion (still other views can also
be considered).
> Another note about numbering. It seems to be that if you repeatedly
> make descriptions of descriptions, you eventually end up with all 0's
> or all 1's,
I don't follow.
> showing that numbers describing numbers is meaningless.
I do not believe much in absolute meaning and I don't think that
numbers needs to mean something (nor to be meant in some way) to
exist.
> Does this also prove that numbers do not have a Platonic existence?
I don't think so. Numbers could have platonic existence even if
they were undescribable (and, indeed, if they were undescribed).
The "Fermat theorem constraint" is always there, ready to apply
to natural numbers, whenever/wherever/however/... they happen to
appear. Even if natural numbers had no platonic existence, this
constraint would be there (and, hence, there would be something
since it is something). I also feel that this type of constraint
implies the (platonic) existence of natural numbers (as well as
the existence of a lot of "mathematical structures" "above"
natural numbers). This is not a proof either, indeed.
Georges.
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Received on Wed Mar 15 2006 - 03:32:29 PST