Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

From: Hal Ruhl <HalRuhl.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2006 20:55:10 -0500

Hi Georges

At 07:32 AM 3/10/2006, you wrote:

>I do not understand. You are considering objects that would not
>have any property at all

No. The most asymmetric divisions of the list possible are those
containing one property in one division and all other properties in
the other division. The Nothing [properties: "empty", "consistent",
"incomplete" - contains nothing] and the All [some of its properties:
"contains the rest of the list", "complete", "inconsistent"]* are an
object pair resulting from a [three:rest] division.

*The All actually contains all the properties of the list so it
contains the list as a potential sub division.

> and objects that would simultaneously
>have all imaginable properties?

Perhaps my definition of objects from the current configuration of my
model would help:

Object: That which has a set of properties. Objects have an
associated degree of potential physical reality. The degree is
distinguished by both imperativeness and duration. Imperativeness is
a measure of the number of universes that can contain - imbed - the
object. Objects with an inconsistent set of properties may have zero
imperativeness. Duration is a measure of the maximum number of
successive states of a universe [another definition] that can imbed
the object that are capable of having a non zero degree of
simultaneous physical reality.

Of course this is now out of the context of the rest of the
description of the model.

Hal Ruhl



--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Mar 11 2006 - 20:56:50 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:11 PST