Re: Simulation - was: Belief, faith, truth

From: John M <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 06:56:13 -0800 (PST)

Norman, Bruno and List:

In #2 I vote for Bruno: 'Nescio no est argumentum',
the fact that we "don't know about..." is not
applicable as an argument.
*
In the question of a 'simulation', however, I find a
more intrinsic point: (IN MY VOCABULARY) information
means "difference acknowledged". So whatever we (can?)
get to knowing is some difference. What means that a
'perfect simulation' (=the thing itself?) does not
show up as 'another thing' in our mind. (Matching
Bruno's view maybe in other words - not far from
Norman's either).

(This is my argument (untold and not submitted as an
argument) - against the infinite 'imitations' of 'our
universe' in certain Multiverse visions. IMO the
universes are different, infinitely in any qualia,
otherwise it makes no sense (to me).)

John M

--- Norman Samish <ncsamish.domain.name.hidden> wrote:

> Bruno,
>
> Thanks for your response. I don't understand why
> you say my argument is not valid. Granted, much of
> what you write is unintelligible to me because you
> are expert in fields of which I know little.
> Nevertheless, a cat can look at a king. Here is
> what we've said so far:
>
> (Norman ONE) My conjecture is that a perfect
> simulation by a limited-resource AI would not be
> possible. If this is correct, then self-aware
> simulations that are perpetually unaware that they
> are simulations would not be possible.
>
> (Bruno ONE) This could be a reasonable conjecture. I
> have explain on the list that if we are a simulation
> then indeed after a finite time we could have
> strong evidence that this is the case, for example
> by discoveries of discrepancies between the
> "comp-physics" and the "observed physics".
>
> (Norman TWO) Humans have not made the discovery
> that they are simulations, therefore the most
> PROBABLE (emphasis added) situation is that we are
> not simulations.
>
> (Bruno TWO) This argument is not valid. The reason
> is that if we could be "correct" simulation (if that
> exists), then that would remain essentially
> undecidable. (Then I could argue the premise is
> false. Violation of bell's inequalities could be
> taken as an argument that we are in a simulation
> (indeed in the infinity of simulation already
> "present" in the "mathematical running" of a
> universal dovetailer, or arithmetical truth.)
>
> (Norman THREE) I don't understand the part of
> "Bruno TWO" in parentheses - I'm not asking you to
> explain it to me. Are you saying that a perfect
> simulation would not necessarily discover it was a
> simulation? If so, I agree. This is supported in
> "Bruno ONE" where you said it was reasonable that if
> we are a simulation we would, in finite time,
> discover that this is the case. Therefore it seems
> to me that my statement in "Norman TWO" is correct -
> note my inclusion of the word "probable." Do you
> agree? Or am I missing your point?
>
> Norman
Received on Sun Feb 05 2006 - 09:57:31 PST