Le 10-déc.-05, à 13:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the
> point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are
> created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this
> make to his experience? It seems to me that there is no test or
> experiment the person could do which would allow him to determine if
> he is living in a period of high measure or low measure.
To determine this with certainty? I agree with you in that case. But we
can make "sure bets".
Take the iterated self-duplication (thought) experiment: You are
"read", "cut" and then "pasted" in two identical rooms except one has
1 drawn on the wall where the other has 0.
Then "each of you" do it again and again.
After 64 duplications you stop. A vast majority among the 2^64 "yous"
will confirms they bet on their normality. Normal experience here is
guarantied by the incompressible information of most bits sequences
(provable by a simple combinatorial analysis).
This is equivalent of betting the halving of the intensity of a beam
of x polarized photons going through a y analyser, with Everett QM.
> If an OM is the smallest discernible unit of conscious experience, it
> therefore seems reasonable to treat multiple instantiations of the
> same OM as one OM.
OK but with comp I have argued that OMs are not primitive but are
"generated", in platonia, by the Universal Dovetailer. A 3- OM is just
an UD-accessible state, and the 1-OMs inherit relative probabilities
from the computer science theoretical structuring of the 3-OMs.
It is the 1 3 person distinction which forces, I think, the relativity
or conditionality of the measure. There is no a priori means to know if
we are, just now, in a Harry Potter (abnormally informative) type of
OM, but we can always bet our next OMs will belong to the set of their
most normal continuators (probably the product of long (deep)
computations with stability on dovetailing on the reals or noise).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Sat Dec 10 2005 - 10:32:16 PST