Saibal Mitra writes:
>The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
>exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
>alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
>see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
>universe we experience seems to be real to us while alternative universes,
>or past or future states of this universe are not being experienced by us.
> > Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> > If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
> > instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
> > several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
> > viewpoint:
> >
> > (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
> >
> > (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
> >
> > (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
Another thought: if I die instantaneously in one of the two branches - that
is, I don't have time to experience that branch at all - is this not
functionally equivalent to being copied and instantaneously killed in
multiple branches? In the next moment, I expect to find myself alive and
continuing to type this in Melbourne, but dead in Sydney, Paris, Mars etc. -
dead almost everywhere else in the multiverse, in fact. Given the reasoning
in support of answer (a), doesn't this mean I should have almost zero
expectation of finding myself alive in Melbourne in the next moment?
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Nov 28 2005 - 19:31:17 PST