Re: Goldilocks world

From: Jesse Mazer <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 22:09:07 -0500

>From: "Stephen Paul King" <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
>To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
>Subject: Re: Goldilocks world
>Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 19:29:39 -0500
>
>Dear Jesse, Stathis, Bruno et al,
>
>----- Original Message ----- From: "Jesse Mazer" <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>
>To: <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>; <everything-list.domain.name.hidden.com>
>Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 4:41 AM
>Subject: RE: Goldilocks world
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>George Levy writes:
>>>
>>>>Along the line of Jorge Luis Borges a blackboard covered in chalk
>>>>contains the library of Babel (everything) but no information. Similarly
>>>>a white board covered with ink also contains no information.
>>>>Interestingly, information is minimized or actually goes to zero when
>>>>the world is too large as the plenitude, or too small. Information is
>>>>maximized when the world is neither too large nor too small. We live in
>>>>a Goldilock world.
>>>
>>>Can we talk about knowledge or intelligence in a similar way? A rock is
>>>completely stupid and ignorant. A human has some knowledge and some
>>>intelligence (the Goldilocks case). God is said to be omniscient:
>>>infinitely knowlegeable, infinitely intelligent. Doesn't this mean that
>>>God is the equivalent of the blackboard covered in chalk, or the rock?
>>>
>>>Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>>Hmm...but isn't it relevant that an omniscient being is only supposed to
>>know all *true* information, while the blackboard covered in chalk or
>>Borges' library would contain all sentences, both true and false? It's
>>like the difference between the set of all possible grammatical statements
>>about arithmetic, and the set of all grammatical statements about
>>arithmetic that are actually true (1+1=2 but not 1+1=3).
>
> Does this assertion not assume a particular method of coding the "true"
>grammatical statements? Could we not show that if we allow for all possible
>encodings, symbol systems, etc. that *any* sequence will code a true
>statement?
>
>Onward!
>
>Stephen
>

A mathematical platonist would believe that true statements about arithmetic
expressed in a particular language represent platonic truths about
arithmetic that are independent of any particular language you might use to
express them. Anyway, an omniscient being would presumably have a specific
language in mind when judging the truth of any statement made in symbols,
whereas Borges' library or the chalkboard does not specify what language
should be used to interpret a given sequence of symbols.

Jesse
Received on Tue Nov 22 2005 - 22:11:28 PST