Re: contention: theories are incompatible

From: rmiller <rmiller.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2005 00:45:17 -0600

At 10:14 PM 11/16/2005, James N Rose wrote:
>An open hypothesis to list members:
>
>"Conservation" as a 'fundamental rule of condition'
>is incompatible and antithetical with any notions
>of "many worlds".
>
>Either explicitly excludes and precludes the other;
>can't have both and retain a consistent existentialism.
>
>J Rose



I haven't kept up with this thread or that idea, but there is no logical
reason that a particular attribute such as "conservation" should be
universal across a many-world manifold. First of all, "conservation" is
ill-defined, but if precisely defined assumes a standard, which implies a
teleological approach. And that is one step away from
scholasticism. Before you know it, you're quoting Plato. Mathematically,
conservation could be defined in terms of least-distance between points,
but if the individual worlds are constructed with their own unique
space-time topology (sort of by definition--otherwise each world would be
the same as the next one) then the term "conservation" would apply only
locally. So, strike two. In fact, one could describe each world as a
unique slice intersecting and *forming* the surface of the many-world
manifold---and each slice could be characterized by its own unique
matrix. Postulating the individual world matrix as a set of elements and
interactions between elements, one could arrive at an "ideal" (Plato
again!) in which each individual world is confined to a minimum number of
elements/interactions. Fine. But it would result in each world being
congruent (homologous) to every other world. The result would be no
difference between worlds, but there is not a shred of evidence that the
configuration works that way at all levels. For example, you coffee may
have cooled according to the observations setting forth the laws of
thermodynamics---and thus predictable, but you sir, probably drove your
automobile in a very inefficient manner today, going places that you
shouldn't have gone (you didn't know the queue would be so long, or the
store would be closed, etc). Now, if you had known that the store would be
closed, etc, you would have been a little more efficient, but that would
require a prescience that you presumably don't have. Maybe that's why, we
can never precisely predict where the electron will "be", because to do so
would identify it's "proper" place---and from there we could then define
it's ideal position. That we cannot (as yet) do that suggests that this
inability to do so is an inherent part of a dynamic system---and is present
within all intersects of the many world manifold.

Short answer: Conservatism is a procedure that produces mental constructs
of what we thing the world is trying to become. It allows us to fit our
observations against the image in our minds, but it has its
limitations. There is no perfect river. Or snowstorm. Or
politician. It's all in our minds.
Received on Thu Nov 17 2005 - 01:48:57 PST