Re: Let There Be Something

From: Quentin Anciaux <quentin.anciaux.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2005 19:26:35 +0100

Hi Jesse,

I think the point is that arithmetical realism is a faith. That every number
has a successor is an axiom, thus considered as true. But while I believe in
arithmetical realism I can conceive that other people don't and see
arithmetical realism/plantonism has not true/real... that somehow a conscious
being is necessary for true statement to exists (I don't think that, and has
I wouldn't want to put words in Tom mouth, I wouldn't say he think that too)

Quentin

Le Lundi 07 Novembre 2005 19:07, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
> Tom wrote:
> >Perhaps there needs to be a new thread for the new topic (Game of Life,
> >etc.).
> >
> >It seems my original inquiry has been left unanswered, but this is my
> >point. My challenge was that multiverse theory is just pulling things out
> >of thin air just as much as any other metaphysical theory. At each point
> >in the history of science, science needs an external foundation to stand
> >on, and by definition this is extra-science. Cluttering up the picture
> > with "Everything" doesn't solve the problem at all. The multiverse is a
> > tautology. Attributing meaning to it is a statement of faith.
> >
> >Tom
>
> What about answering your question in terms of mathematical platonism? It
> seems to me that even if I try to imagine an absolute "nothing", it would
> still somehow be true that 1+1=2, even if there was nothing to count and no
> one to be conscious of this fact...the statement "1+1=2" means something
> like "it is true that *if* you had 1 object and added 1 object you would
> have 2 objects", and that statement is true regardless of whether you
> actually have any objects. But once we say that mathematical forms have
> some sort of necessary existence, we can view our universe (or our
> observer-moment) as just one of many possible platonic mathematical forms,
> perceived "from the inside". But mathematical platonism assumes that all
> possible mathematical forms exist, and so they should seem just as real to
> any observers they contain, leading to the "Everything" view.
>
> Jesse
Received on Mon Nov 07 2005 - 13:28:15 PST