Re: Let There Be Something

From: Hal Finney <hal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 6 Nov 2005 23:29:15 -0800 (PST)

Bruno writes:
> OK. But the word "universe" can be misleading here. It is probably less
> misleading to say that the Universal Dovetailer generates all
> computations. By assuming comp, this generates also all the (first
> person) observer-moments (states/worlds/...).
> The physical reality will emerge from that, but there is no a priori
> reason to believe the UD generates any particular physical reality,
> although we have empirical reason that some quantum dovetailer will win
> the "measure" battle.

Isn't it hard, even assuming comp, to know whether a particular
computation corresponds to a particular first-person observer-moment?
Comp says that I am a computation, at some level of abstraction;
but having faith in that principle will not tell me whether a given
computation implements me. How can I bridge that gap?

> If that means that my probable future, when I am in a comp state S, is
> entirely determined by the collection of computations going through S,
> with "intrinsical weight" determined by the UD (and thus by theoretical
> computer science alone), then OK.

Right, and the same question applies. To know if a given computation
represents one of my first-person probable futures, I have to know quite
a bit. I need to know how to go from a computation to a first-person
experience; and I need to know details of my own first-person experiences
so that I can judge whether a computation "matches" my experiences.

That second part is obvious, I guess; I can be assumed to be aware of
my own experiences. But the first part is what is hard, looking at a
computation and deciding what kind of mind it creates. Do your theories
offer insights into this hard part?

Hal Finney
Received on Mon Nov 07 2005 - 02:29:43 PST