Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list):
> Hi,
>
> I would like talk about this quote from an old topic:
>
>>
>> This is a rather shocking conclusion. We are conscious here and
>> now because our (computational state) belongs to aleph_1 (or
>> 2^aleph_0 for those who doesn't want to rely on Cantor's continuum
>> hypothesis) infinite computational histories !
>> Remember Brice deWitt shock when he realised that at each instant
>> he is multiplied by 10^100. Now it seems that we are multiplied
>> by the continuum (!)
>> (Moreover this is coherent with the Z modal logics).
>>
>> So it seems you are completely right Bob (at least formally), and
>> Russell Standish is also right when he said :"Therefore QTI and the
>> existence of cul-de-sac branches are a mutual contradiction".
>> The pruning of "dead-end" corresponds to the adding of consistency
>> (the modal diamond <>) in the modal definition of observation.
>>
>> Bruno
>
> What about these cul-de-sac branches? Is It definitely that "dead-end"
> branches can exist with the quantum theory of immortality (for example,
> a state of consciousness which can't be follow)?
> And how comp' Bruno theory manage these cul-de-sac branches?
I believe that the quantum theory does not allow cul-de-sac branches.
I also believe that the Godel-Lob theory of self-reference not only
allow cul-de-sac branches, but it imposes them everywhere: from all
alive states you can reach a dead end.
The Universal Dovetailer Argument shows that the physics (which has no
dead ends) should be given by the self-reference logics (with reachable
dead end everywhere).
I have been stuck in that contradiction a very long time ...
... until I realized the absolute necessity of distinguishing the first
and third person point of views. That necessity is implied itself by
the incompleteness phenomena, but that is technical (ask me on the
everything-list if interested).
The intuitive point here is that you cannot have a first person point
of view on your own death: 1-death is not an event, and should be kept
out of the domain of verification of probabilistic statements. Another
intuition: the finite histories are of measure null among the
collection of all histories (the continuum).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Tue Nov 01 2005 - 07:30:29 PST