On 9/22/05, daddycaylor.domain.name.hidden <daddycaylor.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > By 'perceivable' I don't necessarily mean 'perceived by humans', what
> I mean is 'perceivable *in principle* ( i.e. by some mind, somewhere in
> the universe).
>
> I admit my misunderstanding, and that you are talking about the
> unperceivable rather than the unperceived, so the argument about
> eliminating the motivation to discover does not apply, although it does
> apply to those that reject the existence of an objective reality.
>
> > Reality can only ever be understood from the perspective of a mind.
>
> Are you willing to admit that you have to be agnostic (by definition!)
> about the fact that there could be reality that can't be understood by
> a mind?
Yes. But only minds can perceive and comprehend reality. Only minds can
value. The parts of reality that are beyond the comprehension of all
possible minds cannot by definition be directly dealt with by any
metaphysical theory. And what value could they possibly be to us? That's why
I called my theory the 'Sentient Centered' theory. A mind is the most
important thing in the universe because without mind there can be no value
(values come from minds).
What I'm asking is: Why do you limit metaphysics, at the outset, to
> being "for the purposes of understanding general intelligence?" On the
> other hand, how do we know what "general" intelligence is if all we
> have is our human understanding? Thus my example of conscious stars
> which are enlightened about the universe in ways that don't even fit
> into our mind's capability of understanding what enlightened can mean.
Only a general intelligence (a mind capable of fully reflective reasoning)
can value things, perceive things and comprehend things. Therefore any
metaphysical theory needs to deal with those aspects of reality that can in
principle impinge on the mind of a general intelligence.
You make a good point about kinds of consciousness that may be beyond human
understanding. But my theory does not attempt to provide a full explanation
of what general intelligence is. It is simply meant to serve as a logical
scaffolding to which new scientific and philosophical information would
continue to be added. In order for the words 'intelligence' and
'consciousness' to have an unitary meaning, there would have to be *some*
general properties that all possible minds had in common. A metaphysical
theory intended to serve as a 'logical scaffolding' simply has to deal with
these general properties.
> Therefore only things capable of (in principle) making a difference
> to perceived reality need to be taken into account when devising
> ultimate theories of metaphysics.
>
> Is not there a difference between things that "(in principle)" can
> never make a difference to perceived reality (i.e. unperceivable by
> some logical contradiction to perceivability, but yet existing
> somehow), and things that never will make a difference to perceived
> reality because of the limitations of minds (in general)? I admit that
> we can't include the former, but what about the latter?
The latter possibility would mean that there's an unbridgeable seperation
between the thing in itself and a mind's conception of a thing aka Kant.
It's a logical possibility of course but I note that many modern
philosophers reject Kant's idea.
> I don't think the 'perceivable in principle' requirement contradicts
> mathematical Platonism. What makes you think that mathematical
> objects aren't perceivable? True, most *humans* can't perceive
> mathematical things, but that's probably just a limitation of the human
> mind. I think that a mind sufficiently talented at math *could* in
> principle directly perceive mathematical objects. Kurt Godel claimed
> that it was possible to directly perceive mathematical objects. He
> even thought the mind was capable of directly perceiving infinite sets.
>
> What if the proof of Goldbach's Conjecture was such that it could not
> be perceived by a mind? Doesn't our incomplete picture of the mind
> allow for such a possibility?
I suppose so. But it seems unlikely to me. What does the word 'proof'
*mean* if not that there are a series of logical connections each of which
is capable of being comprehended (in principle) by *some* mind? Of course,
there are likely proofs beyond human understanding but such proofs should
not be beyond the understanding of *some* (in principle) sufficiently
powerful mind.
> THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,
> > For, put them side by side,
> > The one the other will include
> > With ease, and you beside.
> >
> >-Emily Dickinson
>
> In all of the history of humans' exploration of the universe, the
> perpetual message that keeps coming back to us from the universe is
> that the brain is not as wide as the sky. I think that trying to make
> an "end run" around "everything" and starting with the doctrine that it
> is, is not a new thing (even to the ancient Greeks), but it contradicts
> the evidence.
>
> Tom
*Given* that we want a metaphysical 'Theory Of Everything' (the name of
this mailing list after all!) we must *assume* as a starting point that mind
can comprehend reality. Our assumption could be wrong. That's why it's
called a *theory* of everything ;)
--
Please vist my website:
http://www.riemannai.org
Science, Sci-Fi and Philosophy
---
THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,
For, put them side by side,
The one the other will include
With ease, and you beside.
-Emily Dickinson
'The brain is wider than the sky'
http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
Received on Wed Sep 21 2005 - 21:42:50 PDT