RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

From: John M <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2005 04:29:49 -0700 (PDT)

--- Lee Corbin <lcorbin.domain.name.hidden> wrote:

> John writes
>
> > > "Computationalism" is yet another claim.
> > > It's the notion that all of our own
> > > thoughts as well could be implemented
> > > on a Turing Machine in a way that would
> > > deliver to us just as much
> > > experiential satisfaction.
> >
> > According to Robert Rosen (who so far identified
> in
> > the best ways those scanty views about his
> > 'complexity' or my 'wholistic [holistic]
> thinking')
> > said about a
> > difference between machine and natural system (my
> > wording) that the former is a design within
> boundaries
> > while the latter is occurring without boundaries
> in
> > connection with the totality - and eo ipso is not
> > TM-computable.
>
> I can't make sense of that. After all, the famous
> "Eliza" program was according to this view a
> machine,
> of course. It was a specific program. But it was
> also what you, evidently, would call a natural
> system because it was open to output from anyone.
> No effort was made to "program in" every possible
> response just as evolution makes no effort to
> "program in" to our DNA every possible contingency.

Eliza was part of a model: responsive to effects
within 'her' program. Within the rules of (possible in
1990 or whatever level)the model of 'physics' with
phenomena, forces, events that far discovered.
Whatever 'she' was receptive to. Beyond that 'she'
can't act, as a limited model, disregarding whatever
is missing for the program for receptiveness - outside
her boundaries. So while you may consider the side of
response 'open' the functioning domain in conditioning
is modeled.

>
> A TM which can be laid down on *any possible* tape
> is analogous to a functioning robot that can be
> presented with any possible environment in which
> to struggle. And just as the TM may fail to perform
> in some wished-for way, so too the robot, like
> ourselves, may simply be inadequate to its new
> environment. That's life.

Both
>to "program in" to our DNA every possible
contingency< and >A TM which can be laid down on *any
possible tape< includes 'possible', a restriction. If
a >robot, like ourselves< - >inadequate to its new
environment< it is a limited model. Wait a second:

Speaking about "us" and our (open to evolution) >DNA<:
brings up the thought that "we" are also models cut
and limited by program potentials of our DNA - not
free to 'nature as a total'. That makes us a 'species'
and cuts
our evolution to 'within' the species model. We do not
grow gears and wings to fly. Or gills. Or magnetic
resonance receptors. (This is a new idea of a view and
I thank you profusely for triggerint that up in me. I
have to think about it. We are not so open either to
every (possible? or even impossible) effect to
respond. Which makes me doubt about the correctness
when I opposed the validity of AI's claim to represent
'human' thinking).
[Maybe I have to reconsider AI (and also AL?) as the
way to imitate the 'model human'??? even 'bio-life'???

The last par is absolutely unchecked, a new idea and a
new view. I am not ready to argue it in any ways.]
>
> Lee
>
Thanks, anyway
John
Received on Thu Sep 08 2005 - 07:32:25 PDT