RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

From: Lee Corbin <lcorbin.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2005 21:35:02 -0700

Bruno writes

> [Hal wrote]
> > I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds
> > can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be
> > simulated on a TM.
>
> They are wrong.

Note that this is just Bruno's opinion. Hal's statement really
is true: most people don't agree with Bruno on this.

> If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot
> perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds
> can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable.

I don't pretend to understand this at all. You are saying
that minds (e.g. we) cannot *perceive* something as being
provably non-turing-emulable, yet minds can nonetheless
*prove* that something is non-turing-emulable.

I (very naively, of course) would have supposed that as soon
as a mind proved that X was Y, then that very mind would
have perceived that X was provably Y.

How confusing.

Lee
Received on Wed Sep 07 2005 - 00:34:04 PDT