On 06 Sep 2005, at 02:27, Lee Corbin wrote:
> Bruno writes
>
>
>> Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will
>> warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot
>> imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality
>> without invoking Church thesis.
>>
>
> That's funny. My doctor never explains even how my blood pressure
> medication works. On the contrary, the surgeons would definitely
> *not* bring up CT when/if they replace a bundle of neurons with an
> electronic cable; their only assurances to the patient are whether
> works or not, and whether I'll feed any pain (besides the bill).
>
> Nor, does it seem, does Microsoft or Intel ever use CT in its
> promotions of various devices for, say, the military. Everyone
> already knows what computers do (roughly), and what can be
> expected of them.
OK, but in the case an artificial brain is proposed the doctor should
explain to his patient that his survival is hypothetical. If not
there will be problems. Well, brain graft surgery is already done and
usually the doctor gives more explanation that those who fixe cars or
any "non directly first person related" object. I think that in the
USA some hospital or universities give some training to the medicine
student so they can remember that their patient are not just third
person manipulable bodies, but also Person. (First) Person.
>
> The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it
> is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious,
> that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own
> term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using
> of "computationalism".
I am very glad with the way the rest of the world (but for some rare
exception I can count with one hand) use the term computationalism,
and I use it in the same way abstracted from the result I got which
shows their contradictions related to their wanting computationalism
married with materialism.
Comp is really for Computationalism in a weaker sense than most
computationalist use the term, and then I give a proof (deductive
argument) that if we take comp seriously enough, keeping in mind the
1-3 distinctions, physics can no more stay "fundamental". Physical
histories and their physical invariant emerges "logico-
arithmetically" from some computer science mathematical structures.
I explain all this in a sufficiently precise way as to be refuted.
Currently facts are going in the sense that QM confirms comp.
I think, Lee, from our last conversation, that you do have understand
the first person comp indeterminacy. Could we move on to UDA step 4 ?
Cf:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf
Bruno
PS Sorry for being slower but I got exams with students and other
typical non-holiday stuffs.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Tue Sep 06 2005 - 11:42:44 PDT