On 02 Sep 2005, at 21:34, kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> [GK]
> Maye you know the links but you surely have not read what they
> point to otherwise
> you would not go on claiming that there are no NON-computable
> processes in the
> physical world!
Please, read what I say. In this list everybody knows that I insist
that comp (I am a machine) entails that there is no primitive
"physical worlds", and that the appearance of a "physical world"
should be non computational. It is the (comp) white rabbits. Reality
is full of non-computable processes. "I am computational" entails
that what I see should be non computational *a priori*, but then, by
taking the incompleteness phenomenon into account, the reasoning
inherit nuances from theoretical computer science. I have already sum
up this by the slogan: [Me = a machine] entails [Not me, as seen by
me, all machines].
This is comprehensible only if you understand the difference between
notions of first and third person point of view. It would be far
easier to follow the 8 steps proof (instead of inferring and
attributing propositions I have never made).
> The case of the general NON-computability of the results of
> individual measurements
> is somewhat more grievious than all of these because, not only QM
> does not in general
> compute them (but computes their statistical distributions quite
> generally) but because we
> know that NO other conceivable local theory does compute them and
> furthermore,
> no other such theory computes their distribution as well as QM! In
> fact the only
> other "mechanistic" (non-local) theories that can claim to compute
> anything like the QM distibutions
> must contain "faster-than-light" propagations and other features
> that violate other
> well supported physical theories! This later result was proved by
> George Svetlichny
> but I am sure you know the link so I need not include it.
You make wrong inferences at each paragraph! But in any case nothing
you allude to is relevant for the understanding that comp implies the
reversal physics/computer-science/number-theory/machine-theology/
<call-it-like-you-want>.
> I wrote "compute" above where I would normaly write "predict"
> because physical theories
> are really analogue algorithms for computing predictions. Turing
> machines are very general
> (but very slow and ineficient) ways of discretizing and encoding
> such algorithms and
> implementing them in special physical systems called digital
> computers to generate
> approximate predictions. This means that no UTM, no UD or UDA or
> any model of
> digital computation (or any physical, calssical or quantum
> computer by that matter)
> that is CT equivalent to them, can compute what QM cannot!
Of course. We know this since Deutsch wrote his fundamental paper on
quantum universal machine.
> So if your UDA produces a "huge amount of non-locality" (whatever that
> means) I can only understand that as meaning that it computes
> (predicts) a whole lot less
> than QM and so, why should I care for it anyway?
This is an interesting and hard question. Now, and this is not a
coincidence, I think that the easiest and shorter explanation follows
directly by the seventh first step of the UDA reasoning. The non-
locality and the indeterminacy (and its measure) will be first person
(plural) notion (subjective in the sense of Everett). In case UDA's
non locality is provably different from the testable non-locality of
our "empirical" most probable computational history, then we are
done, comp, in the way I make it precise, would be refuted. But when
we replace the YD type of grandmother intuition by the possible
discourse of the self-referentially classical sound sufficiently rich
Universal machine (alias the lobian machine), it appears that the
intuitive grandmother indeterminacy inherits a mathematical
structures constrained enough to derive, currently, the propositional
physics (the logic of yes/no answer). Results have been obtained that
this move leads to "some" quantum logic. What form of non-locality?
Open problem. But precise enough to be formulated in a decidable theory.
We care because the UD argument and its translation offer us a nice
alternative by providing a test which either indirectly refute comp
or give us an explanation of the origin of (propositional) physics,
by traditional "natural" science use of OCCAM. In both case we will
learn something which matters for tackling fundamental questions.
> I know this sounds "didatic" but so do you when you run out
> of arguments and send people to your papers
You are still making inference. And negative one. From this I could
quasi-deduce that you have some negative prejudices. This is rather
paradoxical given that we agree!!! (Well, at the grandmother
intuitive level). You believe comp is false (by believing YD false),
and apparently you believe in some material reality, which is indeed
incompatible (explicatively empty) with comp.
You should actually appreciate my showing that comp "eliminates" all
the physicalist token-substances, given that by believing in that
physicalism, it makes you wise to be skeptical on YD. Then I can
understand you fear a little bit more the formal elimination of the
YD, through the lobian interview, which already retrieve a non
trivial propositional physics which until now has confirmed comp and
the quantum. You need just to thrust you own belief: if you are right
the comp physics will be different from the empirical comp, and we
will have precise rational reason to doubt YD. But from what I have
derived so far I am already astonished of the resemblance with QM.
So the reason why you have that negative attitude is a partial
mystery. Those who are *really shocked" by (just) the UDA reversal
are the very many who believe strongly in both YD *and* in the
primitiveness of some material substances (more or less the
materialists, naturalists, physicalists).
Mmh... Well, I see the problem, with your suspicion against YD, you
should love UDA, and then it is all normal to hate AUDA (the lobian
interview) because it shows that the apparently totally insane
conclusion of UDA is not only consistent but also necessary, in some
sense. And if comp is true comp is equivalent with QM (or some of its
possibly corrected updated version), providing a conceptually simpler
explanation of why machines develop beliefs, knowledge, hope, but why
its observable and sharable parts take the shape of the mathematical
physical laws.
I don't understand either why you don't appreciate I refer to my
papers. Note that I have given more explanations on-line on the list.
In case Escribe works again you can search on the author's name:
marchal, marchal bruno, bruno marchal, etc. Look at the links in the
archive. But if you want we can do the UDA step b y step, or even the
AUDA (in case you are willing to study some mathematical logic books).
Did you (try to) unsubscribe?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Sat Sep 03 2005 - 12:38:52 PDT