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From: <kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2005 11:27:48 -0400

-----Original Message-----

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

To: kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden

Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden

Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 12:30:20 +0200

Subject: Re: subjective reality

On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:20, kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:

* > I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has >
*

not been solved.

[BM]

Not meet them so much in my experience. Positive Religious (like

Muslim, Catholic, ...) have build-in solution. It is most of the time

tabu to question them. Negative Religious (like Atheist) have build-in

solution, but are generally not aware of the religiosity of their

solutions. Only (serious) philosopher of mind/cognitive scientists are

aware of the problem.

[GK]

I would leave the "soul" out of my statements. The soul-body problem

was solved long time ago.

[BM]

* > They would probably would also agree
*

* > that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over >
*

the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind

* > stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body->
*

stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you > try

to figure

* > out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your >
*

attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right?

[BM]

Well OK. I guess you make the difference between solipsism and

idealism which can be realist or platonist. The mind stuff is just

numbers and their dreams ...

[GK]

What do numbers dream about? And do the name sheep to go to sleep?

* > You do however
*

* > invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of >
*

YD and than you "turn the tables" on it, so to speak, no?

[BM]

YD has nothing with classical physicalism, unless you assume

physicalism at the start. YD does not assume a universe physically

exist, only that "I" exists and that I am supported by a relatively

stable (sheaf) of computations. Actually the use of the YD in the UD

reasoning is accompanied by an explicit postulation of a physical

universe for making the reasoning easier, but that hypothesis is

explicitly eliminated toward the end of the reasoning.

[GK]

It seems to me that most of your statements mention assumptions that

you accept as starting points only to show that

they are not needed in the end! If you assume that the I is "only

supported by a stable sheaf of computations" aren't

you already assuming what you mean to prove?

* > I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain >
*

(a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable)

[BM]

I really don't understand. To make YD false you must associate

yourself to something non-turing emulable. Nobody has ever found a non,

turing emulable process. Recall that quantum-like indeterminacy can be

retrieved in the self-discourse of self-duplicating machine. Also, with

some notable exception like Penrose, everybody accept YD. I teach about

it since more than 30 years, and only strict dualists (with assumes

explicit substancial soul) criticize it. I told you that those who get

my point (of the UD Argument) and still soes not accept the conclusion

prefer to abandon Arithmetical Realism. It is an empirical discovery in

the sense that (I think we agree here), it is almost nonsense for me to

abandon arithmetical realism.

[GK]

This is patently false and even more so in your much loved platonic

realm which is quite infested with non-digitally computable

entities. Turing was careful to provide an example called the Halting

problem and he also proved that most real numbers are

incomputable but there are many others problems that have been proved

Turing un-computable over the years and mathematicians keep finding

such instances (tilling problems are one big source of examples).

Furthermore people that work in neural network Learning Theory have

began to show that there are by-example methods for leaning

uncomputable problems which I think are very relevant to this question.

Read for example:

http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/lathrop96learnability.html

In physics it is a bit more dificult to argue the uncomputability of

natural processes whose phenomenology one has not studied

fully but there are surely instances of uncomputable within physical

theories that we already know. A classical paper on these

issues in cosmology is by Hartle and Geroch. You will find it at:

www.cs.columbia.edu/~library/TR-repository/reports/reports-1997/cucs-012-

97.ps.gz

There is also a recent book on the subject (which I have not seen) by

Barry Cooper and Piergiorgio Onifreddi.

You can read a review of it at

http://fgc.math.ist.utl.pt/in.pdf

About QM the problem is not simulating indeterminancy but simulating

quantum correlations by local mecanistic means which

is how Turing machines compute! Failed attempts to produce such

emulations by Wolfram are what makes his book well...

ridiculous!!!

About AR I think you also have a misconception of it: AR is the

believe that numbers exist, not the ONLY number exist!

That would be more like pythagorianism, I believe. In any case I am

not suggesting you abandon it...

* > to so
*

* > if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all?
*

[BM]

This is the eleventh time you confuse "p -> q" with "q -> p". Unless

(here) you mean by "demolish YD", the non use of YD in the translation

of UDA in arithmetic.

[GK]

So, you don't demolish it, you just abandon it. OK.

* > Why not proceed to that interview directly?
*

[BM]

You can. But this is like going from physics to the study of

differential equation. Here it would consist to go from cognitive

science to pure mathematics. Actually if you justify that probability

*must* obey to the Bp -> Dp rule (probability one of p entails the

probability of ~p is not one), then OK, you can extract the

comp-physics from math alone. But how will you explain the Bp -> Dp

rule in that context? Why suppress a motivation which also makes the

link with theology: the fact that the comp-doctor cannot pretend that

"science" has show that you can survive with an artificial brain (in

case comp is true).

[GK]

Sorry, but I don't follow here! You get physics but you loose

theology!!! Why do you need the theology?

* > Can that be done and leave your argument intact? That would make it
*

*> a lot more interesting in my opinion...
*

[BM]

You are in minority here, but this is just because most people agree

with YD (or at least it makes sense as an hypothesis in the cognitive

science).

Bruno

[GK]

Ditto.

Godfrey

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Received on Thu Sep 01 2005 - 11:41:02 PDT

Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2005 11:27:48 -0400

-----Original Message-----

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

To: kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden

Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden

Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 12:30:20 +0200

Subject: Re: subjective reality

On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:20, kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:

not been solved.

[BM]

Not meet them so much in my experience. Positive Religious (like

Muslim, Catholic, ...) have build-in solution. It is most of the time

tabu to question them. Negative Religious (like Atheist) have build-in

solution, but are generally not aware of the religiosity of their

solutions. Only (serious) philosopher of mind/cognitive scientists are

aware of the problem.

[GK]

I would leave the "soul" out of my statements. The soul-body problem

was solved long time ago.

[BM]

the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind

stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you > try

to figure

attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right?

[BM]

Well OK. I guess you make the difference between solipsism and

idealism which can be realist or platonist. The mind stuff is just

numbers and their dreams ...

[GK]

What do numbers dream about? And do the name sheep to go to sleep?

YD and than you "turn the tables" on it, so to speak, no?

[BM]

YD has nothing with classical physicalism, unless you assume

physicalism at the start. YD does not assume a universe physically

exist, only that "I" exists and that I am supported by a relatively

stable (sheaf) of computations. Actually the use of the YD in the UD

reasoning is accompanied by an explicit postulation of a physical

universe for making the reasoning easier, but that hypothesis is

explicitly eliminated toward the end of the reasoning.

[GK]

It seems to me that most of your statements mention assumptions that

you accept as starting points only to show that

they are not needed in the end! If you assume that the I is "only

supported by a stable sheaf of computations" aren't

you already assuming what you mean to prove?

(a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable)

[BM]

I really don't understand. To make YD false you must associate

yourself to something non-turing emulable. Nobody has ever found a non,

turing emulable process. Recall that quantum-like indeterminacy can be

retrieved in the self-discourse of self-duplicating machine. Also, with

some notable exception like Penrose, everybody accept YD. I teach about

it since more than 30 years, and only strict dualists (with assumes

explicit substancial soul) criticize it. I told you that those who get

my point (of the UD Argument) and still soes not accept the conclusion

prefer to abandon Arithmetical Realism. It is an empirical discovery in

the sense that (I think we agree here), it is almost nonsense for me to

abandon arithmetical realism.

[GK]

This is patently false and even more so in your much loved platonic

realm which is quite infested with non-digitally computable

entities. Turing was careful to provide an example called the Halting

problem and he also proved that most real numbers are

incomputable but there are many others problems that have been proved

Turing un-computable over the years and mathematicians keep finding

such instances (tilling problems are one big source of examples).

Furthermore people that work in neural network Learning Theory have

began to show that there are by-example methods for leaning

uncomputable problems which I think are very relevant to this question.

Read for example:

http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/lathrop96learnability.html

In physics it is a bit more dificult to argue the uncomputability of

natural processes whose phenomenology one has not studied

fully but there are surely instances of uncomputable within physical

theories that we already know. A classical paper on these

issues in cosmology is by Hartle and Geroch. You will find it at:

www.cs.columbia.edu/~library/TR-repository/reports/reports-1997/cucs-012-

97.ps.gz

There is also a recent book on the subject (which I have not seen) by

Barry Cooper and Piergiorgio Onifreddi.

You can read a review of it at

http://fgc.math.ist.utl.pt/in.pdf

About QM the problem is not simulating indeterminancy but simulating

quantum correlations by local mecanistic means which

is how Turing machines compute! Failed attempts to produce such

emulations by Wolfram are what makes his book well...

ridiculous!!!

About AR I think you also have a misconception of it: AR is the

believe that numbers exist, not the ONLY number exist!

That would be more like pythagorianism, I believe. In any case I am

not suggesting you abandon it...

[BM]

This is the eleventh time you confuse "p -> q" with "q -> p". Unless

(here) you mean by "demolish YD", the non use of YD in the translation

of UDA in arithmetic.

[GK]

So, you don't demolish it, you just abandon it. OK.

[BM]

You can. But this is like going from physics to the study of

differential equation. Here it would consist to go from cognitive

science to pure mathematics. Actually if you justify that probability

*must* obey to the Bp -> Dp rule (probability one of p entails the

probability of ~p is not one), then OK, you can extract the

comp-physics from math alone. But how will you explain the Bp -> Dp

rule in that context? Why suppress a motivation which also makes the

link with theology: the fact that the comp-doctor cannot pretend that

"science" has show that you can survive with an artificial brain (in

case comp is true).

[GK]

Sorry, but I don't follow here! You get physics but you loose

theology!!! Why do you need the theology?

[BM]

You are in minority here, but this is just because most people agree

with YD (or at least it makes sense as an hypothesis in the cognitive

science).

Bruno

[GK]

Ditto.

Godfrey

________________________________________________________________________

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industry-leading spam and email virus protection.

Received on Thu Sep 01 2005 - 11:41:02 PDT

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