Re: subjective reality

From: John M <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 08:00:35 -0700 (PDT)

Hi, Bruno,

Thanks for your considerate reply and for whatever you
expressed your consent to. I try to address the rest:

--- Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> You are using human natural science and human
> science (history) to
> relativize religion.
> And then you are doing the same to relativize an,
> admittedly
> widespread, "religious" belief in science (say).
> "Religious" with quote is always put for some
> pejorative view of
> religion, that is a view with "authoritative
> arguments".
>
> Somehow let me say that I agree
> 99,9999999999999999...%. But it remains a stubbornly
> infinitesimal point of disagreement (even if I
> totally follow your critical conclusions on the
> "religious" science).
>
> To make clearer my critic, I will relate it with
> both Descartes
> systematic doubting procedure (which I would argue
> is at the origin
> of modern theoretical sciences), and the Buddhist
> notion of *the
> center of the wheel" which provides a good image.

JM:
I always had doubts about that 'center of the wheel'
idea: it MOVES with the wheel, whether we see it or
not.
> BM:
> Of course I don't know what is a human being.
JM:
I am just working on how to view it (us?) - not as the
'model' (remember my term) but as a non-entity within
the totality, interconnected with 'them all' but in
various efficiency (strength? depth? closeness?) which
must be a natural(?) distinction in our 'modeling'.
It may lead to a tie between wholistic and
reductionist
views beyond "our choice and taste".
I am tempted to apply (my so far denied) 'attractor'
concept used lately on the list by Ben Goertzel's
blog.
>BM:
> But, as you know, for reason of clarity and modesty,
> I have *choosen* a theory, and I have
> even choose a theory sufficiently precise so that we
> can derive precise conclusions. All what I say must
> be remembered as having been
> casted in the frame of that theory.
(JM:
Precision exactly pertinent to the "model" ways by
cutting out the uncomputable 'rest of the world')
>
>BM:
>
> Now, with comp, there is a little problem in your
> strategy. If human
> are machines, by using human sciences to relativize
> human science,
> you will applied a computable transformation on the
> space of the
> computable transformations, and it can be shown that
> you will get a
> fixed point. It is like making rotating a wheel: all
> its points-
> propositions will move (put in doubt) and be
> relativized except one:
> the center of the wheel.

>
> What is the fixed point? in a nutshell it is science
> itself, but
> where science is understood as an ideal of
> communication conditionned
> by hypothetical statements (some scientists forget
> this; most forget
> this when talking on colleagues' fields).
JM:
see my remark above. The fixed point is moving around
and can be regarded fixed only in a model-view of
itself - the reductionist "science" I mean. I see no
real disagreement, I just continue into a wholistic
image.
> > JM earlier:
> > I differentiate also the "simulation" model, as
> the
> > mathematical or physical simulation of a thing to
> > make it 'understandable(?)
> > There is nothing wrong with model-thinking, it
> helped
> > us to all we know of the world and to our
> technology.
> > Not to 'understanding' the connections.
> BM:
> Why? There is only a (necessary) problem with
> understanding 'understanding'
JM: a loaded word!
> > Wriong it is,
> > if we draw 'universal' conclusions from
> considerations
> > upon a model - and regard it universally valid.
>
> BM:
> I have no models in that sense. The theory which is
> isolated from the
> machine's interview is embeddable in number theory.
>
> > As in the ['topically reduced' models called the]
> > sciences (including I think logics, which is cut
> > to the thinking habits of the HUMAN brain (mind).
My Mail does not take a longer post and 'lost' the
rest of your writing, sorry
John M
Received on Wed Aug 31 2005 - 11:08:48 PDT

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