Re: subjective reality

From: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 18:12:43 -0700

kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
> To: kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200
> Subject: Re: subjective reality
>
>
> On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:

> You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have
> concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two
> of your premises (CT & AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though
> they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic
> evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely
> speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that
> "one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a
> "digital computer" without prejudice to that experience".
> Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to
> your derivation of the *whole of physics* you
> cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware
> of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis,
> in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such
> replacement (which I assume might involve some
> physical interventions).

YD is certainly speculative, but there is considerable evidence that human
experience is an epiphenomena of brain activity - from which is follows that YD
is possible. So far as I know there is nothing in QM that contradicts it. In
fact Tegmark and others have shown that the operation of the human brain must be
almost completely classical. So for YD to be inconsistent with physics it would
have to inconsistent with classical physics.

Why do you think YD is inconsistent with QM?

Brent Meeker
Received on Tue Aug 30 2005 - 21:18:47 PDT