Re: subjective reality

From: Russell Standish <r.standish.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 09:30:07 +1000

On Tue, Aug 30, 2005 at 10:26:46AM -0400, kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> >
> > [GK]
> > You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And
> I
> > don't really have to study your argument because
> > it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are
> > incompatible with the conclusions you claim.
>
> [RS]
> I've never seen Bruno admit that! I've only seen you claim that,
> without proof.
>
>
> [GK]
> Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's:
> ------------
> On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:
>
> > [GK]
> >
> > I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM
> which
> >
> > I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus
> Collapse, by the way.
> >
> > But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that
> does it
> >
> > (and entanglement, of course!)
>
>
>
> [BM]
> >This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus
> YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.


All I see him saying here is that YD is incompatible with wavefunction
collapse, and also with the Bohm interpretation. His UDA does point to
the necessity of a Everett style Multiverse, which does not have
collapse nor a Bohmian-style preferred branch.

...

>
> [GK]
> I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that way
> and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day
> and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims
> before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these
> theories are just poorly put together.
>

That is indeed true. It is cheaper to look for inconsistencies in a
theory that to perform experiments. Also, unbelievable founding
propositions should be eliminated wherever possible.

However, the "claim" (ontological reversal) I take as a sort of
metaphysical principle, ultimately unprovable, but a guide as to how
one thinks about the world. It has the same status as a belief in a
concrete reality, or in Occam's razor. Its utility must be in its
ability to form new scientific theories, rather than in its ability to
predict fact. In my book, I point to a number of specific theoretical
ideas in the theory of consciousness that are implied by ontological
reversal that are currently controversial in cognitive science. The
relationship between self-awareness and consciousness being one of
them. If these specific ideas prove to be of little worth as our
understanding of consciousness improves, then "ontological reversal"
will either be dropped as being of little value, or else appropriately
morphed to yield better theories.

The assumptions of COMP are actually widely supposed to be true, hence
the importance of Bruno's work. He demonstrates that under COMP,
ontological reversal is necessary, and a belief in concrete reality
false.

Curiously, I am in a position where I don't believe COMP to be
strictly true, but is perhaps an approximation of reality. I would be
intrigued in generalisations of the COMP argument. However, I find
that the ontological reversal (or perhaps even ontological "cycle"
with the AP) is metaphysically less extravagant than belief on
concrete reality. Furthermore, the approach really does deliver most
of physics as we know it today, as I argue in my book. I am sceptical
that Bruno's approach of reducing knowledge to various modal logic
structures will deliver much of substance, but at very least I can
appreciate that it is a test of the theory.

> I think there may be something of merit and interest in what Bruno is
> trying out (though my doubts are growing) and that is why I am engaging
> him. There are many ways of being wrong and some are more interesting
> than others.
>

...

>
> [GK]
> Maybe you are right about that and maybe I have been unfair with his
> "theotropic
> verbiage" ; but don't you think there is already something weird about
> needing to cast technical meanings to those terms? What for?
>

I'll let Bruno justify these terms. I think it is probably his way of
translating modal logic expressions into "plain" English...


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Received on Tue Aug 30 2005 - 19:59:14 PDT

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