Le 22-août-05, à 18:51, GottferDamnt (Andy) a écrit (FOR-list):
> I have another problem with the quantum theory of immortality.
> During the superposition of states, *I* am *both* dead and alive, isn't
> it? Or maybe dead parts can't be taken into account because I am not
> conscious of them? Because I don't understand why after a split of
> universe, even if I was conscious during the superposition, I could not
> be in another universe where I would be dead.
You answer your own question. Dead parts, as you say, cannot be taken
into account because you cannot be conscious of them. That is why
Everett said that the probabilities concerned are subjective, not in
the Bayesian sense of interpreting the notion of probability in a
subjective way, but in the sense of objective probabibilties bearing on
subjective element.
Those subjective elements are given by sequences of automata memories
in the MWI. This is based on the assumption of the *classical*
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science (Note that the
"classical" feature is a rare point where Bohr and Everett meet).
Actually this raises many questions because once the comp hyp is
assumed, it remains to explain why the quantum histories win the
*observability conditions* in the competition with *all* classical
computational histories. My point is that comp should justified QM if
one want to use it to justify the subjective (first person)
justification of the collapse of the wave packet, in the manner of
Everett and Deutsch.
Note that your point above justify in the same manner a more general
form of "comp-immortality".
(See my url and the everything mailing list for work and discussion on
similar questions)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Tue Aug 23 2005 - 06:17:24 PDT