Hi Lee,
First I would like to thank you for working hard on this question. In
doing this you are challenging me to refine my ideas and explanations and
thus you are helping me a great deal. That being said, I would like to
refute your "common sense Realism" and show that it is missing the most
salient point of Realism: that it not have any "cracks" through which
anything "unreal" might slip.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Lee Corbin" <lcorbin.domain.name.hidden>
To: "EverythingList" <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 1:37 AM
Subject: RE: subjective reality
> Stephen writes
>
>> Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a
>> Realist
>> accept that "a wholly independent world "out there" exists and existed
>> before he did" and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
>> "independent world" are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
>> particular observational context?
> [LC]
> My opinion is that realists, even those completely up to speed on quantum
> physics, will assert that many macroscopic properties of the "independent
> world" are indeed *definite* before specification of an observational
> context (as you write).
[SPK]
If we are to be consistent with the dictum "all is amplitudes that add"
we must admit that such assertions are a posteriori and not a priori, thus
the problem of explaining the appearance of *definiteness*.
It can be unassailably proven that one cannot embed a quantum universe
inside a classical universe and that one can embed *at least one* classical
universe within a quantum universe. What does this imply? It implies that
the *property definiteness* that comes along with classical universes is
something that cannot be taken as *existing prior to the specification" of
an observational context!
All of the claims that "many macroscopic properties of the "independent
world" are indeed *definite* before specification..." are ignoring that that
entire "independent world" is knowable AFTER the fact of comparing the
observations of many observers. When we assume the contrary we are ignoring
the fact that "what we know" - the content of our OMs as it where- was
specified after the act of having the experience.
We can point to the idea that Numbers and their relationships exist as
such without any dependence on some mathematician's scribbles on a
blackboard, and I would say that that is true, but the notion of the
"meaningfulness" of the concept of numbers, here a case of *property
definiteness*, requires that at least one mathematician scribble on a
blackboard somewhere AND that that scribbling "means" something to some
other mathematician.
A skeptic could point out that chickens scratching in the dirt could
reproduce exactly the same arrangements of points, lines, etc. that make up
"2+2 = 4", but does it mean anything to the chickens? No! Meaningfulness
requires something *to whom it has meaning* and the same applies here to our
idea of an "independent world".
> [LC]
> For example, if today I ascertain certain properties of, oh, say, the
> relative sizes and populations of a number of North American cities,
> then it is best to regard those as entirely fixed. That is, that they
> are *completely* unaffected by measurement. (Which is entirely true
> up to bone-picking.) Evolution in fact did not at all prepare me to
> deal with things whose properties emerge only upon measurement, as
> witnessed by the absolute and dumbfounded astonishment of early 20th
> century physicists.
[SPK]
I strip and fall headlong over your use of the phrase "...then it is
best to regard those as..."! This is what convinces me that you are arguing
for a "common sense realism" and not a realism that can be used without such
caveats!
I have tried many times to talk to you on the phone about the problem in
Einstein's quip, in reaction to Bohr's ideas, that "the Moon does not top
existing just because he is not looking at it", or something along those
lines. The problem is that Common Sense Realist, like yourself and Einstein,
neglect the simple fact that while they are not looking at the moon
directly, the particular world that they are contemplating includes causal
relations that include the moon with its particular properties.
The problem is that if we are going to be consistent with our claim that
the properties of the world or anything in it are *fixed* and "*completely*
unaffected by measurement" then one must be sure to remove each and every
aspect of their actuality that goes into the act of fixing that
definiteness. Here, again, is that "crack" that through which "unreality" is
oozing.
I do not like this unreality one bit and thus am trying to patch up
Realism so it does not have this problem.
> [LC]
> My bottom line: the specification of a particular observational context
> makes a difference *only* on the microscopic level. Now yes, it's true
> that solid objects---according to our best theories---retain their
> integrity only because of quantum effects, but in this and all normal
> macroscopic effects, stability emerges as a statistical and overwhelmingly
> probable phenomenon.
[SPK]
"*ONLY*"! I'm sorry Lee, but that does not cut it! Your argument is just
too positivist for me... If we are going to be consistent then we have to
own up to the REAL implications of your last sentence here:
> solid objects---according to our best theories---retain their
> integrity only because of quantum effects, but in this and all normal
> macroscopic effects, stability emerges as a statistical and overwhelmingly
> probable phenomenon.
> > [SPK]
>> I am claiming that we should not conflate *existence* with *property
>> definiteness*.
> [LC]
> What is the harm for other than microscopic phenomena?
[SPK]
Oh my! Are we not expecting our models of the world to be consistent?
This is like in the theory superstrings where everything is neatly explained
and accounted for except for the pesky little things about not being
background independent, no evidence of superpartners, etc.
I am, working on an idea as to how the appearance of "property
definiteness" comes to be, such that Common Sense Realism works *when we
ignore little details*, but that is for another post. First I need to get
you to admit that the assumption of a priori property definiteness is an
obstacle to the advance of physics.
Onward!
Stephen
Received on Tue Aug 16 2005 - 16:38:03 PDT
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