RE: What We Can Know About the World

From: Lee Corbin <lcorbin.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2005 14:20:35 -0700

Brent writes

> [Lee writes]
> > [Jesse wrote]
> > > Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where
> > > reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most
> > > fundamental level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism"
> > > discussed on that webpage I mentioned.
> >
> > The disagreement I have with what you have written
> > is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most
> > fundamental entities.
>
> There are two distinct kinds of "fundamental". OMs may be epistemologically
> fundamental, but not ontologically fundamental.

We'll see about that! :-)

> Starting with what we think we know, we develop a model
> of reality which goes beyond what we directly experience.
> It's the best explanation of our experience that
> there is a reality not dependent on our thoughts.

I can't argue with that. Yes, indeed, whether individually
as we develop from childhood, or historically, as we develop
away from primitive concepts, (but NOT philologically, as we
develop from early life forms), we fashion all these complicated
explanations of what lies beyond what we directly experience,
e.g., other parts of the light spectrum.

Key is the fantastic accuracy of these models. Fifteen or
more decimal places of accuracy! Let us never forget this!

But I'd suggest that even the stance of a tiger is that of
an explorer who's ready to learn about some aspect of his
environment which has so far escaped him (like lunch). So
the tiger too in a sense understands that there is a reality
not dependent on his thoughts.

I would say that *epistemologically* fundamental are the
usual objects of childhood, which we still regard as
primary most of each day. You know there's a keyboard
in front of you, and about other practical realities
that do not permit you to post all day long on the
Everything list.

Lee

> > It's just so much *clearer* to me to see them arising
> > only after 13.7 billion years or so (locally) and that\
> > they obtain *only* as a result of physical processes.
>
> That seems to be the most parsimonious explanation.
>
> Brent Meeker
Received on Sun Jul 31 2005 - 17:20:21 PDT

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