RE: What We Can Know About the World

From: Jesse Mazer <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2005 00:35:34 -0400

Lee Corbin wrote:

>
>Jesse writes
>
> > Lee Corbin wrote:
> > >
> > >Chris writes
> > >
> > > > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
> > > >
> > > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show
> > > > that sensory perception is
> > > > indirect, and therefore the existence of a
> > > > material cause for those perceptions is an
> > > > unjustified inference in contravention of
> > > > Occam's razor. The argument that the look,
> > > > texture, smell, taste and sound of an object
> > > > are apprehended indirectly is successful in
> > > > my opinion, and I don't feel any need
> > > > to defend it unless someone really thinks
> > > > a defence is required.
> > >
> > > Do *you* contend that the existence of material
> > > causes for your perceptions is unjustified? Good grief.
> >
> > How do you define "material causes"?
>
>I stay clean away from definitions, sorry. I gave
>reasons earlier why definitions don't work.
>
>I expect that you want to know what was meant when
>Chris and I were writing.
>
>I'll get to that.
>
> > It seems to me you are conflating idealism with
> > solipsism, or the idea that the outside universe
> > doesn't have any existence outside of my perception
> > of it, and that there are no objective truths about
> > external reality outside of my subjective ideas about
> > it.
>
>Well, no, I understand the difference, and agree with
>the characterization of it you gave. It sounds as though
>you believe in the existence of things "out there"
>independent of your perceptions of it. That is, if
>you were given a drug that cut off your senses, then
>you'd figure that the outside world was still there
>even though you could no longer sense it. We agree
>on that.
>
>Customarily (whether people like you and me are sensing
>that outside world or not), we believe that for the most
>part here on Earth, at least, there are a lot of material
>objects around. Tables, chairs, rocks, and cars for
>instance.
>
>We can then go further and say that in this model, even
>peoples bodies are material objects, and obey the usual
>high school laws of physics. (They have mass, often
>reflect light, and so forth.)
>
>So by
>
> > > Do *you* contend that the existence of material
> > > causes for your perceptions is unjustified?
>
>I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes
>because your brain is a part of an obviously successful
>survival machine designed by evolution.
>


Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where
reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most fundamental
level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" discussed on that
webpage I mentioned. So does this mean you have no problem with idealism per
se, as long as it does not claim that there is no external reality
independent of *my* perceptions of it (even if this external reality
consists of nothing but other observer-moments, with some sort of measure
attached to each)? Is there anyone on this list who disagrees with the idea
of such an external reality? If not, then who are your criticisms aimed at?

Jesse
Received on Sat Jul 30 2005 - 00:37:26 PDT