Hi Chris,
Thank you for a very interesting discussion of McTaggart's ideas,
frankly after reading Huw Price's "Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point,", I
abandoned any hope of them being useful. My current favorite contender for
an model of time is that of a perpetually ongoing computation; the universe
is constantly computing "what will happen next given some present state".
I like this idea because it automatically explains the perception of a
flowing "present moment". To use an artistic analogy, the universe is a play
whose acts are ab libbed as the actors interact with each other and not a
book that was written "in the beginning".
Kindest regards,
Stephen
----- Original Message -----
From: "chris peck" <chris_peck303.domain.name.hidden>
To: <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 3:05 PM
Subject: RE: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a "dimension"
> Hi Stephen;
>
> Once again thanks for your comprehensive reply, Ive got a reply for one
> bit of it so far:
snip
>
> I think im arguing for caution about McTaggart. I am trying really hard to
> argue for perhaps even more than local realism. I want the moving present,
> which we can not break free of, to be right at the center of our concept
> of time. I want the past to not exist, and I want the future to not exist
> yet.
>
> A (3+1) D block universe is comparable to a McTaggart B series. However, B
> series presuppose time! They are defined as temporal sequences. As events
> in 'before/after' order. They are derivable only, as far as I can see, by
> combining McTaggart C series - say real numbers, numbers that have a
> correspondence with points on an infinate line (which musnt be thought of
> temporally), with his A series (tensed facts: "event e is past"). A+C=B.
> So, A series (tensed facts or temporal token reflexives) are prior to B
> series (temporally sequenced series) just because they are used in the
> derivation of B series.
>
> McTaggart thinks this because he adopts as a premise the idea that change
> is necessary to time, and that a B-Series can not account for change only
> the A series can. The A Series embodies the 'moving present' he thinks,
> events are ordered as future, present and past. It is by associating this
> moving present with a C Series that he thinks a B Series can be derived.
> (note, that according to Kant time and space are a priori intuitions, back
> drops in which objects and events can sit. Following Kant we needn’t
> really agree with McTaggart about change. imho).
>
> However, as he points out, A series are defined in a circular way. An A
> series event can be future, past AND present. To say that event e is
> future also present and also past is just contradictory.
>
> The obvious complaint to McTaggart at this point in the argument is that
> event e is not future, past and present all at once. Event e is the
> future, will become the present and then become the past. Event e is not
> all those things (here it comes) at the same time!
>
> In order to overcome the inherent contradictions in the A-series, an A
> series has had to be invoked again, a meta A series if you like, and
> notice that this second invocation is subject to exactly the same
> criticism as before. We have a Meta e (Me) at which e is future, an Me at
> which e is present, an Me when e is past. A series now of temporally
> flowing meta es, each one of which are (at some time!!!) future, present
> or past. Clearly, the A series is obscuring our concept of time rather
> than elucidating it, and given the B Series is just (A+C) it can not make
> any sense either.
>
> Again, at this stage the illusory nature of the 'subjective time' is
> winning the argument. Having discarded the A Series as incoherent, and
> therefore the B series too because it is derived from the A series, the
> only thing we have left is the C-Series. Something we may metaphorically
> illustrate by real numbers, numbers that have a correspondence with points
> on an infinite line (which mustn’t be thought of temporally). Time then
> does not exist, but is properly concieved of as a dimenstion.
>
> Note, that it doesn’t follow from incoherence in the idea of a B Series,
> it follows from 1) regarding change as necessary to time, and 2) the A
> Series as more fundamental to the others (given it accounts for change).
>
> I want 'now' to be the fundamental concept in any theory of time. Not just
> subjective time, but real objective time. I don’t think appeals to token
> reflexives being more fundamental than before/after, or the necessity of
> change to time manage to establish the priority of the moving present over
> bloc universes, or C Lists such as real numbers.
>
> Thats why I make an appeal to something more intuitive. The A List as
> concieved by McTaggart may lead to incoherence, but nevertheless, we are
> embedded in the present. To meddle with its order is to conjure up
> paradox. Reality can not be like that.
>
>
> Best Regards;
>
> Chris. :)
>
>
>
>
>
>>From: "Stephen Paul King" <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
>>To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
>>CC: "Lee Corbin" <lcorbin.domain.name.hidden>
>>Subject: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a "dimension"
>>Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2005 09:54:55 -0400
>>
>>Dear Chris,
>>
>> I hope to be able to convince you that the ideas that you express
>> below do not yield a coherent narrative. But you must make up your own
>> mind. There are so many assumptions being made that must be
>> reconsidered... What is your background?
>>
>>
>>----- Original Message -----
>>
>>From: "chris peck" <chris_peck303.domain.name.hidden>
>>
>>To: <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
>>
>>Cc: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
>>
>>Sent: Monday, July 11, 2005 9:48 AM
>>
>>Subject: Re: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a "dimension"
>>
>>
>> > Hi Stephen;
>> >
>> > I suppose we can think of time as a dimension. However, there are
>>provisos.
>>
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>>
>> Did you happen to note that my post argued that the idea that "time
>> is a dimension" can only be taken as true in an a posteriori sense? It is
>> when we try to force the entirety of our notions relating to time to fit
>> into the mold of an a priori given ordering of events that things run
>> awry.
>>
>> How familiar are you with the details of quantum mechanics? Did you
>> happen to know that the notion of an observable in QM has a complex value
>> and that a real value only obtains after the multiplication of an
>> observable with its complex conjugate? This operation of conjugation must
>> involve the selection of some basis.. This makes the problem of a
>> pre-existing Real value time to be, at least, doubly difficult.
>>
>> Complex numbers have no natural ordering, as opposed to the Reals,
>> which do, because in general, complex numbers do not commute with each
>> other. Only the very special subset of observables can be said to commute
>> and thus can be mapped to some notion of a "dimension" that one can have
>> translational transforms as functions.
>>
>> In order to have coherent ideas like "time travel", a moving "now"
>> like some flash-light beam that can be moved forwards and backwards,
>> require such contorted mathematics that one can hardly argue that that is
>> how Nature works.
>>
>> > [CP]
>> > Time is not like x, y, or z in so far as we have no ability to freely
>> > navigate the axis in any direction we choose. We are embedded in time
>>and it
>> > moves onwards in a single direction without anyone's consent.
>>Furthermore,
>> > where it possible to move around in time all sorts of paradoxes would
>>appear
>> > to ensue that just don't when I traverse the spatial dimensions. I'd
>>appeal
>> > to an asymmetry between time and space, it is a dimension of sorts, but
>>not
>> > one that can conceptually swapped with a spatial dimension easily. I
>>don't
>> > think the a priori requirements for space will be necessarily the same
>>as
>> > those for time.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>> All we seem to be able to control about time is its rate; we do this
>> by accelerating things or, equivalently, changing their position with
>> respect to gravitational gradients. On the other hand, the notion of
>> "free will" - which some argue is purely an illusion- implies the ability
>> to simultaneously consider some set of possible optional "nows" and chose
>> one as the "next". This is the locus of conflict between the determinism
>> of the classical world and QM where it is said that God(s) play with
>> Dice.
>>
>> How familiar are you with the nuances of Special and General
>> Relativity? I am hardly proficient with the mathematics, but the big
>> picture is very familiar to me - something to do with how a dyslexic
>> thinks. ;-)
>>
>> > [CP]
>> > Therefore, whilst our prior notions of space might be fairly complex,
>> > it
>> > seems to me that our a priori notion of time is in fact very simple. It
>>is
>> > just the notion of succession. That time exists if there is a successor
>> > event to this event. I can imagine a succession of events that are
>> > repetitions of one another, and whilst I can agree that duration would
>>not
>> > be measurable, that time might not be noticed, our a priori notion of
>>time
>> > is not contradicted despite that.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>> The problem is that there can be no single unique "succession of
>> events"! This is the point that I am trying to explain to you! Because
>> observables obey such Principles as Heisenberg's Uncertainty, there can
>> be to single a priori order of events that we can label with ever-larger
>> Real numbers, starting at some Big Bang singularity point as our Zero. It
>> is simply a mental picture that we carry around with us, part of our
>> memories of precious events, all of the information of which is always
>> and only in our "present moment".
>>
>> BTW, this is something that the discussion of Observer Moments seems
>> to be ignoring! A coherent notion of an OM must include some explanation
>> of how one OM includes information about other OMs, which are its
>> "history" within it. Is there some upper bound on the amount of
>> information that any single OM can contain?
>>
>>
>> > [SPK]
>> > 'What is a "clock" if not an means to measure change?'
>> > [CP]
>> > A clock changes in order to measure time. Change is the measure of
>> > time,
>>but
>> > is not necessary for time to occur. Changes do not occur just because
>>time
>> > passes. Change is just necessary for measurement. I agree that time
>>carries
>> > with it the possibility of change, but that is not the same. It cannot
>>be
>> > both necessary and just possible, and the notion of change being a
>> > possibility entails that there is no contradiction in the notion of
>> > time
>>in
>> > which there is no change.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>>
>> No, sorry. That is wrong. Time is a meaningless notion absent the
>> prior notion of change. This makes change priori ontologically to Time.
>> When I state that Time is a measure of change, I am speaking generically.
>> We obtain measures of the duration of some change by comparison to some
>> other duration of change.
>>
>> An old fashioned clock does this by mapping the revolutions of clock
>> hands to the passage of the sun over head, just to pick out one of many
>> interwoven mappings going on. ;-)
>>
>> Your comment that there is a relationship between the "possibility of
>> change" and time is on the right track, but again, there are many cases
>> of changes that are fixed points. The apparent static Sun Dial vane's
>> intransigence as the sun moves over heard being one; but look at the
>> metal making up that vane with a powerful microscope and one sees nothing
>> even close to a static system. As Lee Smolin wrote in his book "Three
>> Roads of Quantum Gravity", pg. 53:
>>
>> "The idea of a state in Newtonian physics shares with classical
>> sculpture and painting the illusion of the frozen moment. This gives rise
>> to the illusion that the world is composed of objects. If this where
>> really the way the world is, then the primary description of something
>> would be how it is, and change in it would be secondary. Change would be
>> nothing but alterations of how something is. But relativity and quantum
>> theory each tell us that this is not how the world is. They tell us - no,
>> better, they scream at us - that our world is a history of process.
>> Motion and change are primary. Nothing is, except in a very approximate
>> and temporary sense. How something is, or what its state is, is an
>> illusion. It may be a useful illusion for some purposes, but if we want
>> to think fundamentally we must not loose sight of the essential fact that
>> 'is' is an illusion."
>>
>> It is ironic to me that Lee Smolin has had a very hard time following
>> his own sage advice in his theoretics, for example see:
>>
>>http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/smolin/smolin_p2.html
>>
>>
>> The best solution that I have found is here:
>>
>>
>>http://www.kitada.com/timeV.html
>>
>>
>> > [CP]
>> > As to how we extract notions of transitivity from series of events, I
>>would
>> > imagine it similar to how we extract notions of causation from sets of
>> > constant conjunctions.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>> Chris, the notion of a "series" has some kind of "greater than" or
>> "less than" relation built in, or else it would not be a "Series". If we
>> want to talk about collections of events, points, etc. that don't include
>> transitive orderings in their defining algebra, we use sets, classes,
>> categories, etc.
>>
>> Set of constant conjunctions can be mapped to notions of causality,
>> of course, that is because their include in their construction (the
>> defining algebra) the property of Associativity and Commutativity.
>>
>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction
>>
>>
>> As I am trying to explain, if we are going to be faithful to the real
>> world and the theories that fit it best, we must never ever assume that
>> the events that make up out world of experience are associative and
>> commutative with each other, except in very special situations.
>>
>>
>> > [SPK]
>> > 'Does a "history"" include values that can be associated with either of
>> > McTaggart's A or B series?'
>> > [CP]
>> > There is a strong argument to suppose it can be. The B series seems to
>>carry
>> > all the information needed to judge truth conditions of reflexive
>>statements
>> > such as 'event E is past' (from the A Series). The statement is true so
>>long
>> > as it is occurs after event E. A B Series can then at least take a part
>>in
>> > our conception of a history.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>>
>> "Seems" is a very big caveat of a word! We have to be careful about
>> the assumptions that we bring to the table. Your statement here seems to
>> be consistent with what I am trying to explain, I do not understand the
>> reason why you do not follow this point! Are you trying to argue for
>> local realism without meaning to?
>>
>>
>> > [CP]
>> > What is needed is a sense of 'now'. A change of time rather than a
>>change in
>> > time, a succession of events. So temporal becoming has to be invoked
>>somehow
>> > - but also, it shouldn't be identified with conscious experience, there
>>is
>> > no requirement for transitivity 'within the frame' so to speak. The
>>danger
>> > with associating temporal becoming with our personal experience of time
>>is
>> > that it is this that appears to deny time. To conclude that our
>>experience
>> > of time is somehow fundamental to time itself, is to deny time exists
>>when
>> > there is no observation of it.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>> We do indeed already have a "sense of now"! What we need is an
>> explanation for why we can't avoid "being in it" and why the heck do its
>> contents keep changing?!
>>
>> The lack of transitivity "within the frame", is very important to
>> notice! There are experiments showing that our conscious experience spans
>> a duration of up to 1/2 of a second, there is some anecdotal evidence of
>> very "long" present moment "windows" of in-transitivity. Anyone that
>> composes music might has an idea of what I am talking about here...
>>
>> But this "within the frame" window idea may be an artifact of how our
>> brains work and not have any relevance to physics in general, but I
>> remain agnostic about this idea.
>>
>>
>> > [CP]
>> > Are you not open to the charge you are levelling at others? Are you not
>>at
>> > least partially a time denier?
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>> Oh no, I am not a time denier. I am arguing that Change, no, Becoming,
>> is a Fundamental aspect of Existence and not Static "Being".
>>
>> I am, with Prof. Kitada, claiming that time is purely a "local"
>> notion and that there is no "universal time" other that what obtains from
>> synchronizations of "local times".
>>
>> http://www.kitada.com/timeIII.html
>>
>>
>> > [CP]
>> > I accept that in a sense we always imagine time from a temporal
>> > perspective, that we can not leap out of the temporal view so to speak,
>>but
>> > whether that should lead to a conclusion that makes experience of time
>> > fundamental is not so clear.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>>
>> Ok, then notice that I am claiming that Change, not time (its local
>> measure), is fundamental.
>>
>>
>> >
>> > [CP]
>> > I prefer to think that temporal becoming is in some way an objective
>> > property of time. I think of it as conceived by Aristotle, as the now
>>that
>> > stays the same, as 'what is now' changes. We experience time as we do
>>with a
>> > future past and present, because of the way time in fact is. Where I
>>think
>> > computational models might break down regards what process they invoke
>>to
>> > run the B series in order to stamp each event with future, now and
>> > past,
>>-
>> > what is their incarnation of 'now' - and whether the adoption of such a
>> > process involves a pernicious infinite regress.
>>
>>[SPK]
>>
>>
>> The pernicious regress only follows from the assumption that changes
>> are some monolithic and universal monotonic aspect of the world. You
>> might enjoy reading Barwise and Seligman's "Information Flow" - all kinds
>> of neat (consistent!) uses of circularity and regress. Drop the
>> assumption of well-foundedness!
>> Try this idea: We do NOT exist in a single space-time manifold. That
>> structure is a collective illusion - but still a "reality"- that results
>> from the coincidental synchrony of our individual observables. We -in
>> ourselves, are not "classical" entities, we are quantum. It is our
>> observations that are classical. This is the lesson that Everett
>> discovered within QM and people have for the most part not yet
>> understood.
>>
>>
>>Kindest regards,
>>
>>
>>Stephen
>
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Received on Tue Jul 19 2005 - 18:08:19 PDT