Le 06-juil.-05, à 02:44, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> Bruno wrote about whether or not we are all the same person.
>
>> Sent: Tuesday, July 05, 2005 1:59 AM
>> Subject: Re: What does "ought" mean? (was RE: Duplicates Are Selves)
>
> I have changed the subject line once again, because this is
> no longer about what "ought" ought to mean.
>
>> Le 04-juil.-05, à 22:18, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>>
>>> Yes, but I contend that while there are two organisms present,
>>> there is only one person. It's much as though some space
>>> aliens kidnapped you and tried to say that Pete at spacetime
>>> coordinates (X1,T1) could not possibly be the same person as
>>> Pete at coordinates (X1,T2) because the times weren't the same.
>>> You'd have to get them to wrap their heads around the idea that
>>> one person could be at two different times in the same place.
>>> They might find this bizarre.
>>>
>>> I'm trying to tell you a possibility that you think equally
>>> bizarre: namely that Pete(X1,T1) is the same person as Pete(X2,T1),
>>> namely that the same person may be at two different locations at
>>> the same time. That's all.
>>
>> I like that idea, but if they are the *same* person then we are
>> all the same person.
>> Or, perhaps you were just meaning that they are very close/similar;
>
> That is so: but moreover, being very very close/similar is what
> should be meant by "the same person".
>
>> in which case you can say Pete(X2,T1) is much closer to
>> Pete(X1,T1) than Bruno(x, now) is close to Lee(y, now).
>> But then, strictly speaking Pete(X1,T1) is not the same
>> person as Pete(X2,T1).
>
> Well, that's up for discussion! That's what we are trying
> to decide.
>
> I say that it gets pretty silly to formulate our ideas so
> that we turn out not to be the same person from second to
> second. Now, yes, in order to evade the notion that one is
> the same person as one's duplicate across the room, people
> will try anything, even denying that they have any identity
> whatsoever. They are, apparently, more comfortable with the
> notion that they are not the same person from second to
> second that the shocking idea that they and their duplicates
> are the same person.
>
>> In any case I am not sure that those distinctions have any
>> bearing on the existence of first person indeterminacy and
>> the problem to quantify that indeterminacy.
>
> (Yes, maybe it is detached from the question you are trying
> to answer.)
>
>> Imagine you are duplicated iteratively. At the start you
>> are in room R. You are scanned and destroyed, painlessly,
>
> given some of the discussions we have, :-) this is rather
> pleasant to entertain
>
>> and we tell you that you will be reconstituted in room 0
>> and in room 1. Then Lee0 and Lee1 are invited in room R
>> again and the experience is repeated. Rooms 0 and 1 are
>> identical and quite separate. The only difference is
>> that in room 0 there is a big 0 drawn on the wall and
>> in room 1 there is a big 1 drawn on the wall.
>
> So as this is repeated, there are 2, then 4, then 8, etc.,
> copies, and each of them remembers a different sequence of
> 0's and 1's.
Yes.
>
>> You are asked to bet on your immediate and less immediate
>> future feeling. Precisely: we ask you to choose among the
>> following bets:
>>
>> Immediate:
>> A. I will see 0 on the wall.
>> B. I will see 1 on the wall.
>> C. I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on the wall.
>> D. I will see 0 on the wall or I will see 1 on the wall.
>>
>> Less immediate:
>> A'. I will always see 0 on the wall.
>> B'. I will always see 1 on the wall
>> C'. I will see as many 0 and 1 on the wall
>> D'. I will see an incompressible sequence of 0 and 1 on the wall
>>
>> And there are three versions of the experiences. In a first version
>> you
>> are always reconstituted in the two rooms.
>
> Okay, let's handle just that for now.
Good idea.
>
>> We suppose obviously that you want maximize "your" benefit(s).
>
> Well, since you are asking *me*, then naturally I'll want a
> global maximum for me, and so a maximal sum for each instance.
Good idea. And quite coherent with your idea that we are our duplicates.
>
>> Each Lee-i is offered 5$ each time his bet is confirmed, but
>> loses 5$ if he makes a wrong bet.
>
> And yes, it would be possible to emphasize to each instance that
> he is to attempt to maximize "his own instance's" earnings.
Quite correct.
>
>> What will be your strategy in each version? Will your strategy differ?
>
> Now if the Lees know all these facts, then they'll anticipate being
> in both rooms upon each iteration. Therefore, they'll anticipate
> losing $5 in one room and gaining $5 in the other. They'll also
> realize that all bit sequences are being carried out. Therefore,
> it doesn't make any difference whatsoever. The expectation of
> each sequence is exactly the same number of dollars: zero.
>
> I don't get the significance of this.
I don't understand your answer, and actually you did not answer. It
looks like you are forgetting I give you the choice between A, B, C, D.
I guess you did choose C, without saying.
In that case you are correct the expectation will be zero. Are you sure
there is not a better strategy among A, B, C, D?
And what about the long run (A', B', C', D') ?
(I agree with you about forgetting the second and third version).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Thu Jul 07 2005 - 06:42:35 PDT