Pete Carlton writes:
[quoting Hal Finney]
>>>If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as
>>>lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies,
>>>an objective reality which governs the extent to which two
>>>different individuals are the same "self", or is it ultimately
>>>a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to
>>>make the determination? Is this something that reasonable
>>>people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about
>>>it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they
>>>work at it long enough?
>>>
>>
>>The former. Remember: "There's no arguing about taste".
>>
>
>I agree. And also remember (from David Hume), "In every system of
>morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the
>author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and
>establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human
>affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the
>usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
>proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
>change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as
>this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis
>necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time
>that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable,
>how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
>different from it."
That's a great quote! All 20th century analytical philosophy can be seen as
a footnote to David Hume. I often see people who are of a scientific bent
trying to reduce ethics (less often, aesthetics) to a matter of reason. It
can't be done; you might start with logic ("is") but you will end up with
axioms that ultimately are are a matter of taste ("ought").
>In other words -- no matter what you think about your degree of identity
>to a person, or how many facts you know about the situation you're in,
>those facts alone can't tell you how you >should< act.
>As to whether duplicates are the same "self", I think this is, again, a
>place where "I" leads us astray. Take this situation: I will create an
>exact duplicate of you. For one 24-hour period you will, from a remote
>location, experience the duplicate living your life (via some
>closed-circuit camera and virtual reality goggles, or something). I will
>then give you the option of either (1) killing yourself (painlessly,
>instantly) and giving the duplicate 5 dollars, or (2) pushing a button
>that makes the duplicate vanish, and you go back to your old life as if
>nothing happened. Lee would choose option (1), I take it, because he sees
>this situation as "I get 5 dollars". I think this interpretation, using
>"I", has an unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really
>saying (in third person terms) is, "Person A ought to terminate person A's
> life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5 dollars)
>more strongly than he desires the existence of (person A)."
>
>Now we can see that by calling them both "I" or "Lee" or "self", Lee is
>merely >providing an ethical justification< to his choice, not making a
>metaphysical statement about personal identities. In other words, it is
>because he extends the "normal" desire of self- preservation to the
>duplicate, that he would accept certain choices. Whether this is in fact
>correct is not a scientific question but one for philosophical ethics (and
>a very interesting one).
There is only one way to unequivocally define what is a duplicate in the
philosophy of personal identity, and that is a *perfect* duplicate of a
person at a particular point in time. If you suddenly die and such a
duplicate exists, no experiences are lost, and it is in fact equivalent to
not dying at all.
--Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Jul 04 2005 - 00:20:38 PDT