Re: Duplicates Are Selves

From: Pete Carlton <pmcarlton.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2005 14:47:29 -0700

On Jul 3, 2005, at 12:56 PM, Jonathan Colvin wrote:

> Hal Finey wrote:
>
>
>> If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as
>> lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies,
>> an objective reality which governs the extent to which two
>> different individuals are the same "self", or is it ultimately
>> a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to
>> make the determination? Is this something that reasonable
>> people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about
>> it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they
>> work at it long enough?
>>
>
> The former. Remember: "There's no arguing about taste".
>

I agree. And also remember (from David Hume), "In every system of
morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d,
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find,
that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought,
or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the
last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new
relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d
and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given;
for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be
a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."

In other words -- no matter what you think about your degree of
identity to a person, or how many facts you know about the situation
you're in, those facts alone can't tell you how you >should< act.

As to whether duplicates are the same "self", I think this is, again,
a place where "I" leads us astray. Take this situation: I will
create an exact duplicate of you. For one 24-hour period you will,
from a remote location, experience the duplicate living your life
(via some closed-circuit camera and virtual reality goggles, or
something). I will then give you the option of either (1) killing
yourself (painlessly, instantly) and giving the duplicate 5 dollars,
or (2) pushing a button that makes the duplicate vanish, and you go
back to your old life as if nothing happened. Lee would choose
option (1), I take it, because he sees this situation as "I get 5
dollars". I think this interpretation, using "I", has an
unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really saying
(in third person terms) is, "Person A ought to terminate person A's
life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5
dollars) more strongly than he desires the existence of (person A)."

Now we can see that by calling them both "I" or "Lee" or "self", Lee
is merely >providing an ethical justification< to his choice, not
making a metaphysical statement about personal identities. In other
words, it is because he extends the "normal" desire of self-
preservation to the duplicate, that he would accept certain choices.
Whether this is in fact correct is not a scientific question but one
for philosophical ethics (and a very interesting one).

Pete Carlton
Received on Sun Jul 03 2005 - 18:03:39 PDT