Hi Bruno;
'Still I believe that no "scientific
communication" can refer ultimately on the intuitive content, which,
even from the subject point of view is just unjustifiable.'
I'ld suggest its a matter of how intuition is used. My intuition can only
guide me in my enquiries, your intuition only you in yours. I cant persuade
you of the truth of a statement by appealing to my intuitive feelings about
it, obviously. Nevertheless, I think it is the light that guides enquiry. I
hope it is for everyone, though clearly with Leslie and others seem more
attracted to the counter intuitive, I have no idea why.
Take the Doomsday Hypothesis, its wrong. Even if the world ended tommorow,
it would still be the case that the Doomsday Hypothesis did not predict it
to any satisfactory meaning of the word 'predict'. Intuitively, I'ld just
say it was luck that someone considered the DH on the day before.
Intuitively, I think that is obvious. But intuition doesnt explain WHY the
Doomsday Hypothesis is wrong, just that it is. Intuition is not analytical
and really it is this that prevents it from having much persuasive power.
But looking at Bostrum and others, its clear how they rely on intuition.
Unless the DH can be tempered in some manner, then they tend to agree that
its conclusion is reason enough to dismiss it.
'The best one, in my opinion are those theories which justifies the ultimate
unnameableness of the first person.'
Do you mean private by 'unnameable'? Are you talking about something akin to
Nagel's characterisation of mind? That it is subjective and consequently
indescribable by a 3rd person account?
'as I show in my PhD thesis (see my url). comp can explain (meta-justify)
why the
ultimate evidence is "conclusive" but ineffable.'
I'll give it a go, sounds interesting.
'I have use the modal logics of self-reference (Solovay's G and G'). Have
you heard about them?'
Nope, im new to a lot of this - thus my joining. Is self reference the same
as self perception? you know as well as refering to myself, i can introspect
to a degree too. Mind may well be inscrutable beyond introspection. I kind
of think it is, though self reference is second nature.
'Also, do you know the paper by Hardegree which shows that quantum
logic can be seen as a Lewis-Stalnaker logic of the counterfactuals?'
hmmm. I thought Stalnaker and Lewis were opposed to one another when it came
to counterfactuals. Lewis believes they are in some sense real, sort of like
Deutsche's multiverse, or infinate number of m-branes and so on, in which
anything logically possible has been actualised at least in one universe or
another. I think Stalnaker would disagree with that, possible worlds are
just convenient ways of considering possibility, rather than actuality. im
sure this is all obvious to you, I'll read your PHD and see if I agree with
that. I hope there isnt too much math.:)
>From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>To: "chris peck" <chris_peck303.domain.name.hidden>
>CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
>Subject: Re: joining.
>Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2005 18:53:03 +0200
>
>
>Le 28-juin-05, à 17:05, chris peck wrote (quoting Kripke)
>
>>'Some philosophers think that something's having intuitive content is very
>>inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think that it is very heavy
>>evidence in favor of anything myself. I really don't know, in a way, what
>>more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately
>>speaking.'
>
>
>I agree with Kripke. Still I believe that no "scientific communication" can
>refer ultimately on the intuitive content, which, even from the subject
>point of view is just unjustifiable.
>The talker must bet enough common intuition to partially justify,
>informally, what he has been able to make purely 3-person communicable to
>its collegues.
>
>Of course we can talk on "theories *on* the first person". We can agree on
>axioms. The best one, in my opinion are those theories which justifies the
>ultimate unnameableness of the first person.
>
>The computationnalist hypothesis (comp) in the theoretical cognitive
>science (alias philosophy of mind) does just that, as I show in my PhD
>thesis (see my url). comp can explain (meta-justify) why the ultimate
>evidence is "conclusive" but ineffable.
>
>For this, I have use the modal logics of self-reference (Solovay's G and
>G').
>Have you heard about them?
>
>Also, do you know the paper by Hardegree which shows that quantum logic can
>be seen as a Lewis-Stalnaker logic of the counterfactuals?
>
>Pardon my questioning.
>
>Welcome to the list,
>
>Bruno
>
>
>
>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
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Received on Wed Jun 29 2005 - 11:59:00 PDT