Hilgard's "hidden observer"

From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2005 16:44:09 -0400

Dear Richard,

    Let me follow up on your suggestion: Assuming a "personality" is made up
of multiple modules,does it necessarily follow that a "hidden observer"
exist as a seperate entiry, or could it be that the usual single personality
results from an entrainment (the modules become like oscillators that couple
to each other) over the many modules?
    This idea predicts that if this entrainment mode is unstable and there
are other possible metastale entrainment modes possible, then the
personality that emerges is unstable; we get the symptons of
multiple-personality disorder that makes "personalities" analogous to the
metastable (phase space) orbits of a chaotic system.
    If no stable or metastable entrainments between the multiple modules
obtain, we have the symptoms of autism. No?

Kindest regards,

Stephen

----- Original Message -----
From: "rmiller" <rmiller.domain.name.hidden>
To: "Norman Samish" <ncsamish.domain.name.hidden>; <everything-list.domain.name.hidden.com>
Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 3:58 PM
Subject: Re: Have all possible events occurred?


> At 10:22 AM 6/26/2005, Norman Samish wrote:
>
>>"Stathis Papaioannou" writes: Of course you are right: there is no way to
>>distinguish the original from the copy, given that the copying process
>>works
>>as intended. And if you believe that everything possible exists, then
>>there
>>will always be at least one version of you who will definitely experience
>>whatever outcome you are leaving to chance. Probability is just a first
>>person experience of a universe which is in fact completely deterministic,
>>because we cannot access the parallel worlds where our copies live, and
>>because even if we could, we can only experience being one person at a
>>time.
> RM Comments: (1) I'll have to disagree with Stathis' (apparent) statement
> that "probability is just a first person experience of a universe."
> No proper foundation. (2) Additionally, Stathis assumes that we cannot
> access the parallel worlds where our copies live. Since no one
> can even define consciousness, or isolate precisely where memory is
> located (or even what it is), there is no way we can preclude simultaneous
> experience. The best we can say is, "we simply don't know." And, (3),
> for the same reasons, we cannot say that we "experience being one person
> at a time." There are numerous psychological models---neodissociationism
> being just one---that posit a personality made up of multiple modules, all
> interacting (somewhat) under the guidance of an executive, Hilgard's
> "hidden observer." Unless and until we fully understand how consciousness
> is linked to personality, we probably shouldn't preclude multiple or
> simultaneous experience.
Received on Sun Jun 26 2005 - 16:46:11 PDT