Eric Cavalcanti writes:
>I do not equate my identity with the matter that composes my body at all.
>I would say that my personal identity cannot be defined in a
>communicable way, in the way I see it. I believe there is something
>fundamental about consciousness.
>
>I guess that my position could be made analogous to the following thought
>experiment: suppose you are playing a virtual simulation game, and in the
>game you enter a copy machine just like the one we are discussing. The
>game is programmed to feed your (real) brain with the experience of being
>in
>the same room every time you press the button but seing all these copies
>of your virtual body being created in New York. Of course there's no
>question
>of who you are. You are not the copies in New York. While playing the game
>you do not feel concerned that you could suddenly appear in New York and
>be trapped in the simulation after pressing the button.
>
>In this example my identity would undoubtedly be located in my real brain.
>I imagine an analogous situation for my identity in the real world, with
>the difference that I can't (or I don't know how to) unplug from it. But
>clearly it is not located in my body anymore than it was located in my
>virtual body inside the simulation.
>
>But of course I find this position quite uncomfortable, because I cannot
>acount for other people's consciousness in any well defined way. And
>since I don't like solipsism, i.e., I like to believe in other people's
>consciousness, I must say it's deeply unsatisfactory.
>
>But not enough to believe that I could experience being teleported to New
>York.
You've made it clear that you would not enter a machine which destructively
scans you and teleports you, because that would be like suicide. But what if
you had no choice? Say the Enterprise is about to be blown up by Klingons,
and it is clear that you can either stay on board and face certain death, or
teleport out and face what you see as probable death. Would you choose to
teleport? And if you did, and a moment later found yourself safely on the
surface of a nearby planet, with all your friends from the Enterprise, would
that convince you that teleportation is not suicide? And even if it didn't
quite convince you, would you be pragramatic about it, i.e., "I've tried it
once and I didn't feel any different at all, so if it is suicide and
replacement by a copy, then suicide and replacement by a copy isn't nearly
as bad as I thought; so maybe I'll just start using it all the time like
everyone else does."
--Stathis Papaioannou
_________________________________________________________________
SEEK: Over 80,000 jobs across all industries at Australia's #1 job site.
http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
Received on Fri Jun 24 2005 - 08:28:12 PDT