----- Original Message -----
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <jcolvin.domain.name.hidden>
To: "'Russell Standish'" <r.standish.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: "'EverythingList'" <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 09:52 PM
Subject: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)
> Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > >(JC) If you want to insist that "What would it be like
> > to be a bat"
> > > > >is equivalent to the question "What would the universe be like
> > > > if I had
> > > > > been a bat rather than me?", it is very hard to see what the
> > > > > answer could be. Suppose you
> > > > > *had* been a bat rather than you (Russell Standish).
> > How would the
> > > > > universe be any different than it is now? If you can
> > answer that
> > > > > question, (which is the key question, to my mind), then
> > I'll grant
> > > > > that the question is meaningful.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > No different in the 3rd person, very obviously different
> > in the 1st
> > > > person
> > >
> > > I don't really know what that means. The only way I can
> > make sense of
> > > the question is something like, "If I was a bat instead of me
> > > (Jonathan Colvin), then the universe would consist of a bat
> > asking the
> > > question I'm asking now." That's a counterfactual, a way in
> > which the
> > > universe would be objectively different.
> >
> > It wouldn't be counterfactual, because by assumption bats ask
> > this question of themselves anyway. Hence there is no
> > difference in the 3rd person. The 1st person experience is
> > very different though. There are only 1st person counterfactuals.
>
> That's quite an assumption. *Do* all conscious things ask this question of
> themselves? Babies don't. Senile old people don't. I'm not sure that
> medieval peasants ever thought to ask this question, or pre-literate
> cavemen.
>
>
> >
> > I definitely acknowledge the distinction between 1st and 3rd
> > person. This is not the same as duality, which posits a 3rd
> > person entity (the immaterial soul).
> >
> > >
> > > This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue
> > with the DA.
> > > My (and
> > > your) reference class can not be merely "conscious
> > observers" or "all
> > > humans", but must be something much closer to "someone (or thing)
> > > discussing or aware of the DA).
> >
> > I don't think this is a meaningful reference class. I can
> > still ask the question "why am I me, and not someone else"
> > without being aware of the DA. All it takes is self-awareness IMHO.
>
> You *could* certainly. Perhaps it is important as to whether you actually
> *do* ask that question (and perhaps it should be in the context of the
DA).
>
>
> > > I note that this reference class is certainly appropriate
> > for you and
> > > me, and likely for anyone else reading this. This reference class
> > > certainly also invalidates the DA (although immaterial souls would
> > > rescue it).
> > >
> > > But at this point, I am, like Nick Bostrom, tempted to
> > throw my hands
> > > up and declare the reference class issue pretty much intractable.
> > >
> > > Jonathan Colvin
> >
> > Incidently, I think I may have an answer to my "Why am I not Chinese"
> > criticism, and the corresponding correction to "Why am I not an ant"
> > seems to give the same answer as I originally proposed.
>
> I'd be interested to hear it. Here's something else you could look
> at...calculate the median annual income for all humans alive today (I
> believe it is around $4,000 /year), compare it to your own, and see if you
> are anyway near the median. I predict that the answer for you (and for
> anyone else reading this), is far from the median. This result is
obviously
> related to the "why you are not Chinese" criticism, and is, I believe, the
> reason the DA goes astray.
>
> Jonathan Colvin
I don't think so, because most people on Earth are not Chinese. The correct
refutation of the Doomsday Paradox was given by D. Dieks and involves the
Self Indicating Axiom. The definition of the reference class defines the set
of observers that you consider to be you. The DA involves applying Bayes's
theorem and to do that correctly you have then to use the correct a priori
probability which is also fixed by the choice of the reference class. The
two effects cancel and there is no Doomsday Problem. This is all explained
here:
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081
Saibal
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>
Received on Mon Jun 20 2005 - 16:40:47 PDT