RE: Dualism and the DA

From: Jonathan Colvin <>
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2005 10:44:47 -0700

Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible
without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to
figure out).

If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I am copy #1 in
washington) and (B) (I am copy#2 in washington), then in what way does it
make sense to say that situation A OR situation B might have obtained?

This seems to be the crux of the objection to any theory which reifies 1st
person phenomena.

Jonathan Colvin

>Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is
>strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and
>not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly
>unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate
>explanation (assuming c.).
>Le 16-juin-05, à 23:02, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
>> Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
>>> Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm
>>> conscious (feels like I am, anyway).
>> Hi Jonathan,
>> I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated
>> (using your
>> analogy) by :
>> Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather Jonathan
>> Colvin ? I (as RS) could have been you (JC)... but it's a fact that
>> I'm not, but the question is why I'm not, why am I me rather
>than you
>> ? What "force"
>> decide
>> for me to be me ? :)
>> Quentin
Received on Fri Jun 17 2005 - 13:45:53 PDT

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