Oops sorry. I did misunderstood you. Thanks for the clarification. I
agree with your preceding post to Hal now.
Bruno
Le 13-juin-05, à 16:23, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal:
>>>>
>>>> To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x
>>>> and x' from the similarity of x and x'.
>>>> I am not sure that makes sense for me.
>>>> In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x,
>>>> involves a 'white rabbit events'.
>>>
>>> It's not completely separable, but I'd think that "similarity" would
>>> mostly be a function of memories, personality, etc...even if I
>>> experience something very weird, I can still have basically the same
>>> mind. For example, a hoaxer could create a realistic animatronic
>>> talking white rabbit, and temporarily I might experience an
>>> observer-moment identical to what I'd experience if I saw a genuine
>>> white talking rabbit, so the "similarity" between my current
>>> experience and what I'd experience in a white rabbit universe would
>>> be the same as the "similarity" between my current experience and
>>> what I'd experience in a universe where someone creates a realistic
>>> hoax. I don't think the first-person probabilities of experiencing
>>> hoaxes are somehow kept lower than what you'd expect from a
>>> third-person perspective, do you?
>>
>> Perhaps I misunderstood you, but it seems to me, that in case you ask
>> me to compute P(x -> y) (your notation), it could and even should
>> change that prediction result. In particular if the rabbit has been
>> generated by a genuine hoaxer I would predict the white rabbit will
>> stay in y, and if the hoaxer is not genuine, then I would still
>> consider x and x' as rather very dissimilar. What do you think? This
>> follows *also* from a relativisation of Hall Finney's theory based on
>> kolmogorov complexity: a stable white rabbit is expensive in
>> information resource. No?
>
> Well, note that following Hal's notation, I was actually assuming y
> came before x (or x'), and I was calculating P(y -> x). And your
> terminology is confusing to me here--when you say "if the hoaxer is
> not genuine", do you mean that the white rabbit wasn't a hoax but was
> a genuine talking rabbit (in which case no hoaxer is involved at all),
> or do you mean if the white rabbit *was* a hoax? If the latter, then
> what do you mean when you say "if the rabbit had been generated by a
> genuine hoaxer"--is the white rabbit real, or is it a hoax in this
> case? Also, when you say you'd consider x and x' as very dissimilar,
> do you mean from each other or from y? Remember that "dissimilar" is
> just the word I use for continuity of personal identity, how much two
> successive experiences make sense as being successive OMs of the "same
> person", it doesn't refer to whether the two sensory experiences are
> themselves dissimilar or dissimilar. If I'm here looking at my
> computer, then suddenly close my eyes, the two successive experiences
> will be quite dissimilar in terms of the sensory information I'm
> taking in, but they'll still be similar in terms of my background
> memories, personality, etc., so they make sense as successive OMs of
> the same person. On the other hand, if I'm sitting at my computer and
> suddenly my brain is replaced with the brain of George W. Bush, there
> will be very little continuity of identity despite the fact that the
> sensory experiences of both OMs would be pretty similar, so in my
> terminology there would be very little "similarity" between these two
> OMs.
>
> As for the cost of simulating a white rabbit universe, I agree it's
> more expensive than simulating a non-white rabbit universe, but I
> don't see how this relates to continuity of identity when experiencing
> white rabbits vs. not experiencing them.
>
> Jesse
>
>
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Mon Jun 13 2005 - 10:45:51 PDT