Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2005 15:55:27 +0200

Le 13-juin-05, à 15:39, Jesse Mazer a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal:
>> To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and
>> x' from the similarity of x and x'.
>> I am not sure that makes sense for me.
>> In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x,
>> involves a 'white rabbit events'.
> It's not completely separable, but I'd think that "similarity" would
> mostly be a function of memories, personality, etc...even if I
> experience something very weird, I can still have basically the same
> mind. For example, a hoaxer could create a realistic animatronic
> talking white rabbit, and temporarily I might experience an
> observer-moment identical to what I'd experience if I saw a genuine
> white talking rabbit, so the "similarity" between my current
> experience and what I'd experience in a white rabbit universe would be
> the same as the "similarity" between my current experience and what
> I'd experience in a universe where someone creates a realistic hoax. I
> don't think the first-person probabilities of experiencing hoaxes are
> somehow kept lower than what you'd expect from a third-person
> perspective, do you?

Perhaps I misunderstood you, but it seems to me, that in case you ask
me to compute P(x -> y) (your notation), it could and even should
change that prediction result. In particular if the rabbit has been
generated by a genuine hoaxer I would predict the white rabbit will
stay in y, and if the hoaxer is not genuine, then I would still
consider x and x' as rather very dissimilar. What do you think? This
follows *also* from a relativisation of Hall Finney's theory based on
kolmogorov complexity: a stable white rabbit is expensive in
information resource. No?

Received on Mon Jun 13 2005 - 10:18:52 PDT

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