Re: Questions on Russell's "Why Occam" paper

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2005 18:16:07 +1000

I'm not sure I follow your reasoning, but it wouldn't surprise me if
the Turing subset of my world has additional constraints - namely the
worlds seen by observers whose O(x)'s are prefix machines, not just maps.

On Fri, Jun 10, 2005 at 05:56:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-juin-05, ? 14:59, Patrick Leahy a ?crit :
> >>Russell Standish:
> >>If the AP applies to the Sims Mark VII, then their reality will be a
> >>description containing a "body" corresponding to their intelligences.
> >>They will not be aware of the PC that their description is being
> >>generated on. We, who inhabit the world with the PC will not be aware
> >>of the countless other PCs, Macs, Xboxes, Eniacs, Turing machines,
> >>pebbles in Zen monasteries etc running Sims Mark VII. So the PC
> >>itself is actually irrelevant from the internal perspective of the
> >>Sims.
> >
> >Well at least we agree on that. No strange loops in this picture, so
> >it is unlike the picture you outline in your paper.
> >
> Aargh .... Bad luck! A point where I disagree with both Schmidhuber
> *and* Standish, at least here apparently.
> To explain I must assume comp and ... (for one) explicitly the *result*
> of my thesis. In a nutshell: it is that, if comp is assumed, then the
> correct law of physics are derivable from comp. (it makes comp
> testable: derive physics from comp and compare with empirical physics).
> I will call the physics derived from comp: the comp-physics.
> Please admit this if only for the sake of the argument.
> Suppose I build a simulated city with some self-aware entities evolving
> in that simulated environment. Then
> Either I simulate the correct comp physics, then apparently the
> simulated entity cannot know they are simulated by me, but actually
> this sentence has no meaning, because they are simulated by 2^aleph_0
> immaterial stories (constituting arithmetical truth), so it is only in
> a weak sense that they are failed. (actually it is not even possible to
> simulate comp physics except in the "ridiculous" sense of running
> (really) the universal dovetailer.
> Or I simulate incorrect comp physics, then the only way we could say
> the simulated entity are failed is
> 1) either by killing them (in some absolute way) when they discover
> discrepancies between the comp-physics they can find by herself and
> their fake environment. But in that case their story is finite and its
> measure can be shown equal to 0. Or
> 2) eithert I keep up correcting the simulation, but then in the limit I
> don't fail them. Or I limit the cognitive ability of the entities, but
> then either I will failed to genuinely fail them, or I will make them
> inconsistent (and here too the measure can be shown equal to zero, and
> that is related to the non-cul-sac phenomenon).
> It is an amazing positive consequence of machine's incompleteness that
> you cannot genuinely failed any (relatively simulated or not) machine
> having enough introspection power for a "very long time".
> Apparently, In machine's platonia, all lies leads soon or later to a
> (recognizable) catastroph.
> Tp prevent falling into an inconsistency, this last conclusion follows
> from comp, and remember that if comp is correct we cannot "know" it is
> correct, and we cannot probably know that all lies leads soon or later
> to a (recognizable) catastroph. But if you *bet* on comp, you can bet
> on it!
> Bruno

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Received on Sun Jun 12 2005 - 04:27:43 PDT

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