Le 09-juin-05, à 23:10, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
> Bruno wrote:
>
> There's a third possibility, which is that the "I" pre-split can not be
> identified with either of the post-split individuals. As per my
> reponse to
> Stathis, the question is ill-posed. You can interview the non-tortured
> individual post-split, and while it may feel to him that he is "me",
> the
> same will be true for the other individual. So which is "me"? The most
> sensible response is that the question is ill-posed.
Yes but then, with comp or just MWI (Many World Interpretation of QM),
all question on my future is ill-posed. But clearly this is empirically
untenable. If I look to a cat in the state DEAD+ALIVE, I put myself in
the state I.DEAD + I.ALIVE, and if this made the question ill-posed,
not only you must abandon comp, but you must reintroduce the collapse
in QM.
>
> If I take a loaf of bread, chop it half, put one half in one room and
> one
> half in the other, and then ask the question "where is the loaf of
> bread?",
> we can likely agree that the question is ill-posed.
Obviously. But the bread has no first person point of view. The main
point with comp (or QM-without collapse- is that although we are
3-duplicable (like the bread) we are not 1-duplicable. If you cut me in
Brussels and paste me in both Sidney and Beijing then by comp I
survive, but by comp I will survive at the places, but still i will
feel to be in one place, either Beijing or Sidney, without any clue why
"I am the one in Sidney" or "I am the one in Bejing".
You can also iterate the dupl. experiment 64 times and interview the
2^64 resulting individuals. A vast majority will conclude it is
equivalent with a Bernouilli experiences, and by comp, that is the
right conclusion.
>
> The question "what will I feel tomorrow" only has an answer assuming
> that
> tomorrow there is a unique "me".
But there will be a unique 1-me, even if they will be a lot of 3-me.
> If I have been duplicated, there is no
> longer a definite answer to the question.
Either you are right, but then comp is false, or you are failing to see
that we can be both 1-uncertain and 3-certain. If the 1-uncertainty is
not quantifiable then comp is false.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Fri Jun 10 2005 - 10:04:39 PDT