Jonathan Colvin writes:
> > > > You are offered two choices:
> > > >
> > > > (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads, you
> > > > will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
> > > >
> > > > (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the
> > copies will be
> > > > tortured, and the other 9 will not be tortured.
> > > >
> > > > By your reasoning, there is a 50% chance you will be
> > tortured in (a)
> > > > and a 100% chance you will be tortured in (b), so (a) is
> > better. But
> > > > I would say the probabilities are (a) 50% and
> > > > (b) 10%, so (b) is clearly the better choice.
> > >
> > >Hmmmm...I'd disagree. Emotionally, (a) feels the better
> > choice to me;
> > >in
> > >(b)
> > >I'm definitely getting tortured, in (a) I may dodge the bullet. On a
> > >purely objective basis (attempting to mimimize the amount of
> > torture in
> > >the world),
> > >(a) is also obviously superior.
> > >
> > >This would make an interesting poll. Who prefers (a) over (b)?
> >
> > Imagine what would happen if you chose (b). You enter the
> > teleportation sending station, press the green button, and
> > your body is instantly and painlessly destructively analysed.
> > The information is beamed to 10 different receiving stations
> > around the world, where an exact replica of you is created
> > from local raw materials. One of these receiving stations is
> > situated in a torture chambre, and the torture will commence
> > immediately once the victim arrives.
> >
> > Now, what do you think you will actually experience the
> > moment after you press the green button? Do you expect to
> > feel any different because there are now 10 copies of you? Do
> > you expect that the copy being tortured will somehow send
> > signals to the other 9 copies? If not, then how will the 100%
> > chance that one of the copies will be tortured affect you if
> > you happen to be one of the other copies?
>
>How will I feel after pressing the button? Your question has a structural
>issue. You are asking "what do you think you will experience the moment
>after you press the green button?". This question is ill-posed, because
>post-split, the pre-split "you" no longer clearly refers to any one person,
>so the question as posed is unanswerable.
>
>Of course, post split there will be ten "Jonathan Colvin"s, each of whom
>calls themselves "me". But there is no longer any one-to-one correspondence
>with the pre-split me, so it makes no sense to ask what "I" will experience
>after pushing the button.
>From a third person perspective there is no one to one correspondence, but
from a first person perspective, there is: each of the ten copies remembers
being you pre-split. Perhaps I could ask the question differently. If it
turns out that the many worlds interpretation of QM is true, then you will
be duplicated multiple times in parallel universes in the next second. When
you contemplate how you are going to feel in the next second in the light of
this knowledge, do you expect anything different to what you would expect in
a single world system? Is there any test you could do to determine whether
there is one world or many?
--Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Thu Jun 09 2005 - 19:39:16 PDT