Le 08-juin-05, à 21:54, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
>
>>> Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
> convincing argument
>>> for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
>> all, *me*
>>> (although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we
>>> were copied and started diverging.
>>
>> Yes, this is exactly my position, except that I'm not sure I
>> would necessarily care more about what happens to my copy than
>> to a stranger.
>> After all, he knows all my secrets, my bank account details,
>> my passwords...
>> it's not difficult to see how we might become bitter enemies.
>>
>> The situation is different when I am considering my copies in
>> the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two
>> copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because
>> that means there is 1/2 chance that I will "become" the
>> torture victim. When tomorrow comes and I am not the torture
>> victim, I am relieved, because now I can feel sorry for my
>> suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a stranger. You could
>> argue that there is an inconsistency here: today I identify
>> with the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But whether it is
>> inconsistent or irrational is beside the point:
>> this is how our minds actually work. Every amputee who
>> experiences phantom limb pain is aware that they are being
>> "irrational" because there is no limb there in reality, but
>> knowing this does not make the pain go away.
>
> This is incorrect, I think. At time A, pre-split, there is a 100%
> chance
> that you will *become* the torture victim. The torture victim must
> have once
> been you, and thus you must become the torture victim with probability
> 1.
> There's no inconsistency here; you are quite right to be worried at
> time A,
> because you (at time A) *will* be tortured (at time B). The
> inconsistency
> comes with identifying (you at time A, pre-split) with (one of the
> you's at
> time B, post-split). There can be no one-to-one correspondence.
To sum up I am duplicated, and one of the copy will be tortured, the
other will not be tortured. You say that there is 100% chance I will be
tortured. If we interview the one who is not tortured he must
acknowledge his reasoning was false, and the proba could not have been
= to 100% chance. Are you not identifying yourself with the one who
will be tortured (in this case you make the error you pretend Stathis
is doing. If not, it means you identified yourself with both, but this
would mean you do the confusion between 1 and 3 person, given that we
cannot *feel* to be two different individuals.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Thu Jun 09 2005 - 05:15:33 PDT