Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2005 17:42:54 +0200

Le 08-juin-05, à 14:18, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> Jonathan Colvin writes:
>> That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on
>> an
>> ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of
>> ourselves
>> getting hurt than a complete stranger?
>> I have little doubt that I *would* rather a stranger get stuck than
>> my copy,
>> but only, I think, because I would have more empathy for my copy than
>> for a
>> stranger, in the same way that I would have more empathy for my mother
>> getting stuck than I would for someone I don't know.
>> Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any convincing argument
>> for
>> favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after all, *me*
>> (although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we
>> were
>> copied and started diverging.
> Yes, this is exactly my position, except that I'm not sure I would
> necessarily care more about what happens to my copy than to a
> stranger. After all, he knows all my secrets, my bank account details,
> my passwords... it's not difficult to see how we might become bitter
> enemies.
> The situation is different when I am considering my copies in the
> future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two copies, one of
> whom will be tortured, I am worried, because that means there is 1/2
> chance that I will "become" the torture victim. When tomorrow comes
> and I am not the torture victim, I am relieved, because now I can feel
> sorry for my suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a stranger. You
> could argue that there is an inconsistency here: today I identify with
> the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But whether it is inconsistent or
> irrational is beside the point: this is how our minds actually work.
> Every amputee who experiences phantom limb pain is aware that they are
> being "irrational" because there is no limb there in reality, but
> knowing this does not make the pain go away.

This shows that you (Stathis) and Jonathan accept the first three steps
of the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA). It remains just 5 steps to
understand the reversal, both ontological and epistemological, between
physics and computer science/number theory.
May be you could print the unique pdf slide for help:

And you can find the explanation of the eight steps in the html document
or you can print the equivalent in pdf:

You see, it is not difficult. It looks you find the first three steps
by yourself.
Hope you will succeed in convincing Lee. And some others ?

I am curious if you accept the fourth step.

Received on Wed Jun 08 2005 - 11:50:27 PDT

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