RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

From: Brent Meeker <>
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2005 22:31:57 -0000

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Bruno Marchal []
>Sent: Monday, June 06, 2005 12:36 PM
>To: Brent Meeker
>Cc: EverythingList list
>Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>Le 06-juin-05, à 01:40, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> What do you take to be the standard definition of "knows"? Is it "X
>> knows Y"
>> iff "X believes Y is true" and "Y is true"?
>That's the one by Theaetetus.
>> Or do you include Gettier's
>> amendment, "X knows Y" iff "X believes Y is true" and "Y is true" and
>> "There is
>> a causal chain between the fact that makes Y true and X's belief that
>> Y"?
>It could depend of the axiom chosen to describe belief.
>For knowability I take the S4 axioms and rules:
>1) axioms:
><all classical tautologies>
>BX -> X
>BX -> BBX
>B(X->Y) -> (BX -> BY)
>2) Rule:
>X X -> Y X
>----------- ----- (Modus ponens, necessitation)
> Y BX
>But in the interview of the Lobian machine I recover the S4 axioms +
>Grz, from
>defining "knowing X" by "proving X formally and X true" (I apply the
>Theaetetus on
>formal provability).
>I cannot use Gettier's given that I have no notion of causality to
>start with. (Recall
>I don't have any physical notion to start with).

In that case, how does "true" differ from "provable"? If it is simply a formal
system, with no facts which can make a proposition true by reference, then it
seems that there is no separate notion of "true" apart from "provable".

Brent Meeker
Received on Tue Jun 07 2005 - 02:24:53 PDT

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