Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2005 08:24:26 +0200

Hi Brent,

Le 05-juin-05, à 13:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Bruno Marchal []
>> Sent: Sunday, June 05, 2005 7:02 AM
>> To: "Hal Finney"
>> Cc:
>> Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>> Le 05-juin-05, à 05:53, Hal Finney a écrit :
>>> Lee Corbin writes:
>>>> But in general, what do observer-moments explain? Or what does the
>>>> hypothesis concerning them explain? I just don't get a good feel
>>>> that there are any "higher level" phenomena which might be reduced
>>>> to observer-moments (I am still very skeptical that all of physics
>>>> or math or something could be reduced to them---but if that is
>>>> what is meant, I stand corrected). Rather, it always seems like
>>>> a number of (other) people are trying to explain observer-moments
>>>> as arising from the activity of a Universal Dovetailer, or a
>>>> Platonic ensemble of bit strings, or something.
>>> I would say that observer-moments are what need explaining, rather
>>> than
>>> things that do the explaining. Or you could say that in a sense they
>>> "explain" our experiences, although I think of them more as *being*
>>> our experiences, moment by moment. As we agreed:
>>>>> An observer-moment is really all we have as our primary experience
>>>>> of
>>>>> the world. The world around us may be fake; we may be in the
>>>>> Matrix
>>>>> or
>>>>> a brain in a vat. Even our memories may be fake. But the fact
>>>>> that
>>>>> we
>>>>> are having particular experiences at a particular moment cannot be
>>>>> faked.
>>>> Nothing could be truer.
>> All right. So you both (Hal Finney and Lee Corbin) with the first
>> axiom
>> defining a knower. It is the incorrigibility axiom: let us write Cp
>> for
>> "to know p" (or to be aware of p, or to be conscious of p).
>> incorrigibility can be stated by:
>> Cp -> p
>> Meaning that for any proposition p we have that Cp -> p is true.
>> The implication arrow "->" is just the classical implication. It has
>> nothing to do with notions of causality, or deduction or whatever ...
>> We can define A -> B by ((not A) or B) or (not (A and not B)) as this
>> can be verified by truth-table. I recall:
>> A -> B
>> 1 1 1
>> 1 0 0
>> 0 1 1
>> 0 1 0
>> OK?
> No. To be conscious of p, where p is some proposition, doesn't imply
> that p is
> true - one is often mistaken.

You are right. (i *was* supposing p true!)

> It seems to me that the incorrigibility of
> experience is just CCp->Cp, i.e. propositions that you seem to
> perceive "p" may
> be incorrigble. Cp->p only works where p isimplicitly is of the form
> Cq.

OK, but this is Loeb theorem and I will use the B instead of C.
I continue to accept Cp -> p for standard knowledge. We don't say say
"John knew that (a+b)^2 = a^2 + b^2, but he was false" we say ""John
believed that (a+b)^2 = a^2 + b^2, but he was false" . By definition we
cannot know something false. It is the standard definition. But you are
right I should not have used the term "conscious" nor "aware" here!

Thanks for the correction,

Received on Mon Jun 06 2005 - 02:28:40 PDT

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