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From: Saibal Mitra <smitra.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat, 28 May 2005 15:22:31 +0200

----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----

Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>

Aan: <smitra.domain.name.hidden>

CC: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>

Verzonden: Saturday, May 28, 2005 07:26 AM

Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

*> Saibal Mitra wrote:
*

*>
*

*> >You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could be
*

in.

*> >
*

*> >1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things.
*

These

*> >experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were
*

more

*> >or less random. Then we can conclude that there are 2^n OMs that all have
*

a

*> >probability proportional to 2^(-n). The probability that you are one of
*

*> >these OMs isn't small at all!
*

*> >
*

*> >2) Considering perforing n suicide experiments, each with 50% survival
*

*> >probability. The n bits have registered the fact that you have survived
*

the

*> >n suicide experiments. The probability of experiencing that is 2^(-n).
*

The

*> >2^(n) -1 alternate states are all unconscious.
*

*> >
*

*> >
*

*> >So, even though each of the states in 1 is as likely as the single state
*

in

*> >2, the probability that you'll find yourself alive in 1 is vastly more
*

*> >likely than in 2. This is actually similar to why you never see a mixture
*

*> >of
*

*> >two gases spontaneously unmix. Even though all states are equally likely,
*

*> >there are far fewer unmixed states than mixed ones.
*

*>
*

*> I understand your point, but I think you are making an invalid assumption
*

*> about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's available
*

*> to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
*

*> Suppose a trillion trillion copies of my mind are made today on a computer
*

*> and run in lockstep with my biologically implemented mind for the next six
*

*> months, at which point the computer is shut down. This means that most of
*

my

*> measure is now in the latter half of 2005, in the sense that if you pick
*

an

*> observer moment at random out of all the observer moments which identify
*

*> themselves as being me, it is much more likely to be one of the copies on
*

*> the computer. But what does this mean for my experience of life? Does it
*

*> mean that I am unlikely to experience 2006, being somehow suspended in
*

2005?

I would say so. You would find yoursef to be suspended in 2005, just like

you are now suspended between 1900 and 2100. But this would require the

simulations of your mind in 2005 to dominate over all other versions of you.

Now unless experiencing 2006 would require a miracle this can't be the case.

The reason is that all possible versions of you 'already' exist in the

multiverse. Your measure in 2005 is what it is. This includes the effects of

others simulating your mind experiencing 2005 (the simulation can be done at

any time, of course).

So, you can say that your measure for experiencing time t is:

m(t) = m_{biol}(t) + m_{sim}(t)

m_{biol} being the 'biological' contribution of your measure and m_{sim} the

digital contribution. Both terms are fixed by the laws of physics. If indeed

m_{sim}(2005) is trillions of times larger than m_{biol}(2005) and zero at

other times, you would be suspended in 2005. But this cannot be the case

unless there is some reason why m_{sim}(t) is so strongly peaked around

2005. If there are branches in which someone is simulating you in 2005 for

no good reason, then that decision is taken at random. That means that in

some other branch you are simulated in some other time. So, the measure

isn't strongly peaked around 2005 at all!

*>
*

*> More generally, if a person has N OM's available to him at time t1 and kN
*

at

*> time t2, does this mean he is k times as likely to find himself
*

experiencing

*> t2 as t1? I suggest that this is not the right way to look at it. A person
*

*> only experiences one OM at a time, so if he has "passed through" t1 and t2
*

*> it will appear to him that he has spent just as much time in either
*

interval

*> (assuming t1 and t2 are the same length). The only significance of the
*

fact

*> that there are "more" OM's at t2 is that the person can expect a greater
*

*> variety of possible experiences at t2 if the OM's are all distinct.
*

The same is true here. It must follow from the laws of physics (which

include the effects of simmulations) that there are indeed many more copies

of you at t2.

Saibal

Received on Sat May 28 2005 - 09:24:51 PDT

Date: Sat, 28 May 2005 15:22:31 +0200

----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----

Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>

Aan: <smitra.domain.name.hidden>

CC: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>

Verzonden: Saturday, May 28, 2005 07:26 AM

Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

in.

These

more

a

the

The

in

my

an

2005?

I would say so. You would find yoursef to be suspended in 2005, just like

you are now suspended between 1900 and 2100. But this would require the

simulations of your mind in 2005 to dominate over all other versions of you.

Now unless experiencing 2006 would require a miracle this can't be the case.

The reason is that all possible versions of you 'already' exist in the

multiverse. Your measure in 2005 is what it is. This includes the effects of

others simulating your mind experiencing 2005 (the simulation can be done at

any time, of course).

So, you can say that your measure for experiencing time t is:

m(t) = m_{biol}(t) + m_{sim}(t)

m_{biol} being the 'biological' contribution of your measure and m_{sim} the

digital contribution. Both terms are fixed by the laws of physics. If indeed

m_{sim}(2005) is trillions of times larger than m_{biol}(2005) and zero at

other times, you would be suspended in 2005. But this cannot be the case

unless there is some reason why m_{sim}(t) is so strongly peaked around

2005. If there are branches in which someone is simulating you in 2005 for

no good reason, then that decision is taken at random. That means that in

some other branch you are simulated in some other time. So, the measure

isn't strongly peaked around 2005 at all!

at

experiencing

interval

fact

The same is true here. It must follow from the laws of physics (which

include the effects of simmulations) that there are indeed many more copies

of you at t2.

Saibal

Received on Sat May 28 2005 - 09:24:51 PDT

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