----- Original Message -----
From: Patrick Leahy <jpl.domain.name.hidden>
To: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: Everything-List <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: 26 May 2005 19:54
Subject: RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark
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> * But the arbitrariness of the measure itself becomes the main argument
> against the everything thesis, since the main claimed benefit of the
> thesis is that it removes arbitrary choices in defining reality.
I don't think we can reject the thesis that all logically possible
universes exist, just because its analysis is proving tricky (or even if it
were to prove beyond us), and certainly not if we have reasonable candidates
for a measure basis.
I use fundamental philosophical principles effectively to infer the
existence of all possible distinguishable entities (which would include both
individual, and clusters of, physical universes), much if not all of which
should be modellable by formal systems. In the context of SAS-containing
universes, this seems to me a reasonable starting point for an in-principle
measure basis, particularly when consideration of 'compressed' entities (not
logically disbarred) leads to a prediction of the predominance of simpler
universes.
But I agree that going any further with particular predictions, particularly
after factoring in Tegmark's other levels, is likely to prove, shall we say,
at least a little way off ;)
Alastair
Philosophy paper at:
http://www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm
Received on Fri May 27 2005 - 05:08:49 PDT