Le 25-mai-05, à 13:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Lee Corbin writes:
>
>> > But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
>> > implemented on a computer.
>> > We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
>> > experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
>> > we start doing either of these things, we are replacing the 3rd
>> > person perspective with the 1st person.
>>
>> Yes. Doesn't it seem that you want the impossible? That you want
>> to be the code and yet remain someone else?
>>
>> It seems like only by actually *being* that code---having its
>> emotional reactions, its same impressions of everything---can
>> you possibly know what it's like... to be the code. This point
>> was made by someone here before. Namely, that if *you* become
>> a bat in order to learn what it's like to be a bat, then "you"
>> aren't you anymore.
>
> I agree with everything you have said. You have to be the code to know
> what it is like to be the code. And consciousness is the only thing in
> the universe of which this is true.
>
> --Stathis
I do agree too. Mainly. But, to prevent future misunderstandings, I
think it is better to say we are the owner of the code. If we forget
this it will be hard to figure out later that consciousness can not
been exclusively associated to the code but to some equivalence class
of the code through the multiverse (or UD* the effective set of all
computational histories). We would miss eventually the possibility of
interference both with comp and with Everett's QM.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Wed May 25 2005 - 09:13:19 PDT