Le 22-mai-05, à 10:13, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>
>> [Stathis] Perhaps this is true, but it is
>> not logically consistent to say that it must be true and still
>> maintain the
>> 1st person/ 3rd person distinction we have been discussing. This is
>> because
>> the whole point of the distinction is that it is not possible to
>> deduce or
>> understand that which is special about 1st person experience (namely,
>> consciousness) from an entirely 3rd person perspective.
>
> Yes, in other words, it is ineffable.
Exactly. Like consistency for sound or just consistent machines, if you
simplify "ineffable" by unprovable. (Godel's second incompleteness
theorem)
Please, don't infer that I identify consciousness and consistency, but
I do think consciousness is a "logical descendant" of consistency.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Sun May 22 2005 - 11:30:14 PDT